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Most economic models are based on the !"#$%&'(")"!(* +,-.(+"!&! that assumes that /## people are
"01#2!&3"#, motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have
gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis. The evidence
suggests that many people are strongly motivated by other-regarding preferences and that concerns for
fairness and reciprocity cannot be ignored in social interactions. Moreover, several theoretical papers
have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable
manner. Some of these models shed new light on problems that have puzzled economists for a long
time like, e.g., the persistence of non-competitive wage premia, the incompleteness of contracts, the
allocation of property rights, the conditions for successful collective action and the optimal design of
institutions. These theories in turn induced a new wave of experimental research offering additional
exciting insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories
of fairness. The purpose of this paper is to review these recent developments, to point out open
questions, and to suggest avenues for future research. Furthermore, we will argue that it is not only
necessary but also very promising for mainstream economics to take the presence of other-regarding
preferences into account.
Why are economists so reluctant to give up the self-interest hypothesis? One reason is that this
hypothesis has been quite successful in providing accurate predictions in some economic domains. For
example, models based on the self-interest hypothesis make very good predictions for competitive
markets with standardized goods. This has been shown in many carefully conducted market
experiments. However, a large amount of economic activity is taking place outside of competitive
markets – in markets with a small number of traders, in markets with informational frictions, in firms
and organizations, and under incompletely specified and incompletely enforceable contracts. In these
environments models based on the self-interest assumption frequently make very misleading
predictions. An important insight provided by some of the newly developed fairness models is that they
show why in competitive environments with standardized goods the self-interest model is so successful
and why in other environments it is refuted. In this way the new models provide fresh and
experimentally confirmed insights into important phenomena like, e. g., non-clearing markets or the
wide-spread use of incomplete contracts.
We consider it as important to stress that the available experimental evidence also suggests that
many subjects behave quite selfishly even when they are given a chance to affect other peoples well
being at a relatively small cost. However, there are also many people who are strongly motivated by
fairness and reciprocity and who are willing to reward or punish other people at a considerable cost to
themselves. One of the exciting insights of some of the newly developed theoretical models is that the
interaction between fair and selfish individuals is key to the understanding of the observed behavior in
strategic settings. These models explain why in some strategic settings almost all people behave as if
they are completely selfish, while in others the same people will behave as if they are driven by
fairness.
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Most economic models are based on the !"#$%&'(")"!(*+,-.(+"!&! that assumes that /## people are
"01#2!&3"#, motivated by their material self-interest. Many influential economists, including
Adam Smith (1759), Gary Becker (1974), Kenneth Arrow (1981), Paul Samuelson (1993) and
Amartya Sen (1995), pointed out that people often do care for the well-being of others and that
this may have important economic consequences. Yet, so far, these opinions have not had much
of an impact on mainstream economics. In recent years experimental economists have gathered
overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis. The evidence
suggests that many people are strongly motivated by other-regarding preferences and that
concerns for fairness and reciprocity cannot be ignored in social interactions. Moreover, several
theoretical papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a
rigorous and tractable manner. Some of these models shed new light on problems that have
puzzled economists for a long time like , e.g., the persistence of non-competitive wage premia,
the incompleteness of contracts, the allocation of property rights, the conditions for successful
collective action and the optimal design of institutions. These theories in turn induced a new
wave of experimental research offering additional exciting insights into the nature of preferences
and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of this paper is
to review these recent developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for
future research. Furthermore, we will argue that it is not only necessary but also very promising
for mainstream economics to take the presence of other-regarding preferences into account.
Why are economists so reluctant to give up the self-interest hypothesis? One reason is that
this hypothesis has been quite successful in providing accurate predictions in some economic
domains. For example, models based on the self-interest hypothesis make very good predictions
for competitive markets with standardized goods. This has been shown in many carefully
conducted market experiments. However, a large amount of economic activity is taking place
outside of competitive markets – in markets with a small number of traders, in markets with
informational frictions, in firms and organizations, and under incompletely specified and
incompletely enforceable contracts. In these environments models based on the self-interest
assumption frequently make very misleading predictions. An important insight provided by some
of the newly developed fairness models is that they show why in competitive environments with
standardized goods the self-interest model is so successful and why in other environments it is
refuted. In this way the new models provide fresh and experimentally confirmed insights into
2important phenomena like, e. g., non-clearing markets or the wide-spread use of incomplete
contracts.
We consider it as important to stress that the available experimental evidence also
suggests that many subjects behave quite selfishly even when they are given a chance to affect
other peoples well being at a relatively small cost. However, there are also many people who are
strongly motivated by fairness and reciprocity and who are willing to reward or punish other
people at a considerable cost to themselves. One of the exciting insights of some of the newly
developed theoretical models is that the interaction between fair and selfish individuals is key to
the understanding of the observed behavior in strategic settings. These models explain why in
some strategic settings almost all people behave as if they are completely selfish, while in others
the same people will behave as if they are driven by fairness.
A second reason for the reluctance to give up the self-interest hypothesis is
methodological. There is a strong convention in economics of not explaining puzzling
observations by changing assumptions on preferences. Changing preferences is said to open
Pandora’s box because everything can be explained by assuming the “right” preferences. We
believe that this convention made sense in the past when economists did not have sophisticated
tools to examine the nature of preferences in a scientifically rigorous way. However, due to the
development of experimental techniques this is no longer true. In fact, one purpose of this paper
is to show that much progress and fascinating new insights into the nature of fairness preferences
have been made in the past decade. While there is still much to be done this research clearly
shows that it is possible to discriminate between theories based on different preference
assumptions. Therefore, in view of the facts, the new theoretical developments, the importance of
fairness concerns in many economic domains, and in view of the existence of rigorous
experimental techniques that allow us to examine hitherto unsolvable problems in a scientific
manner, we believe that it is time to recognize that a substantial fraction of the people is also
motivated by fairness concerns. People do not only differ in their tastes for chocolate and bananas
but also along a more fundamental dimension. They differ with regard to how selfish or fair-
minded they are, and this does have important economic consequences.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides many real life examples
indicating the relevance of fairness considerations and reviews the experimental evidence. It
shows that the self-interest model is refuted in many important situations and that a substantial
number of people seem to be strongly concerned about fairness and behave reciprocally. Section
3 surveys different theoretical approaches that try to explain the observed phenomena. In the
3meantime there is also a large and growing literature on the evolutionary origins of reciprocity
(see, e.g., Bowles and Gintis 1999, Gintis 2000, Sethi and Somananthan forthcoming and 2000).
We do not discuss and review this literature in our paper. Section 4 discusses the wave of new
experiments that have been conducted in order to discriminate between these theories. Section 5
explores the implications of fairness driven behavior in various economic applications and offers
some directions for future research. Section 6 concludes.1 In view of the length of our paper it is
also possible to read the paper selectively. For example, readers who are already familiar with the
basic evidence and the different fairness theories may go directly to the new evidence in Section
4 and the economic applications in Section 5.
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The notion of fairness is frequently invoked in families, at the workplace, and in people’s
interactions with neighbors, friends and even strangers. For instance, our spouse becomes sour if
we do not bear a fair share of family responsibilities. Our children are extremely unhappy and
envious if they receive less attention and gifts than their brothers and sisters. We do not like those
among our colleagues who persistently escape doing their share of important yet inconvenient
departmental activities.
Fairness considerations are, however, not restricted to our personal interactions with
others. They shape the behavior of people in important economic domains. For example,
employee theft and the general work morale of employees is affected by the perceived fairness of
the firm’s policy (Bewley 1999;.Greenberg 1990). The impact of fairness and equity norms may
render direct wage cuts unprofitable (Agell and Lundborg 1995; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler
1986). Firms may, therefore, be forced to cut wages in indirect ways, e.g., by outsourcing
activities. Fairness concerns may thus influence decisions about the degree of vertical integration.
They may also severely affect the hold-up problem as demonstrated by Ellingsen and
Johannesson (2000). Debates about the appropriate income tax schedule are strongly affected by
notions of merit and fairness (Seidl and Traub 1999). The amount of tax evasion is likely to be
affected by the perceived fairness of the tax system (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 1998; Alm,
                                                
1 In the meantime there is also a large and growing literature on the evolutionary origins of reciprocity (see, e.g.,
Bowles and Gintis 1999, Ginitis 2000, Sethi and Somananthan forthcoming and 2000). We do not discuss and review
this literature in our paper.
4Sanchez, de Juan 1995; Frey and Weck-Hanneman 1984). Public support for the regulation of
private industries depends on the perceived fairness of the firms’ policies (Zajac 1995).
Compliance with contractual obligations, with organizational rules and with the law in general is
strongly shaped by the perceived fairness of the allocation of material benefits and by issues of
procedural justice (Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997, Lind and Tyler 1988). The functioning
of incentive-compatible mechanisms has been shown to depend on fairness considerations
(Andreoni and Varian 1999). The solution of collective action problems like, e.g., rules
regulating the access to common pool resources, critically depends on the fairness of the
allocation of the costs and benefits of the rules (Ostrom 1990 and 2000; Falk, Fehr and
Fischbacher 2000c). The erosion of public support for the welfare state in the US in the last two
decades has probably also much to do with deeply entrenched notions of reciprocal fairness
(Bowles and Gintis 2000). Many people cease to support public programs that help the poor if
they have the impression that the poor do not attempt to bear their share of a society’s
obligations.
Thus, real world examples where fairness concerns are likely to matter abound.
Nevertheless, in the following we concentrate on clean experimental studies because in most real
life situations it is impossible to unambiguously isolate the impact of fairness motives. A skeptic
may always argue that the notion of fairness is only used for rhetorical purposes that disguises
purely self-interested behavior in an equilibrium of a repeated game. Therefore, we rely on
experimental evidence of human decision making. In these experiments real subjects make
decisions with real monetary consequences in carefully controlled laboratory settings. In
particular, the experimenter can implement one-shot interactions between the subjects so that
long-term self-interest can be ruled out as an explanation for what we observe. As we will see, in
some experiments the monetary stakes involved are quite high – amounting up to the income of
three months’ work. In the experiments reviewed below subjects do not know each others’
identity, they interact anonymously and, sometimes, even the experimenter cannot observe their
&'4&3&42/# choices.
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In hindsight, it is a bit ironical that experiments have proven to be critical for the discovery and
the understanding of fairness-driven behavior because for several decades experimental
economists were firmly convinced that fairness motives would not matter much. At best, fair
behavior was viewed as a temporary deviation from the strong forces of self-interest. In the 1950s
5Vernon Smith discovered that under relatively weak conditions experimental markets quickly
converge to the competitive equilibrium.2 Since then the remarkable convergence properties of
experimental markets have been confirmed by hundreds of experiments (see, e. g., Davis and
Holt 1993). For these experiments the equilibrium is computed under the assumption that /##
players are "01#2!&3"#, self-interested. Therefore, the quick convergence to equilibrium has been
interpreted as a confirmation of the self-interest hypothesis. We will see later in this paper that
this conclusion was premature because, as the newly developed models of fairness (see Section 3
and Section 5.1) show, convergence to standard competitive predictions can occur even if agents
are very strongly concerned about fairness.
This strong commitment to the self-interest hypothesis slowly weakened in the 1980s
when experimental economists started to study bilateral bargaining games and interactions in
small groups in controlled laboratory settings (see e.g. Roth, Malouf and Murningham 1981,
Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze 1982). One of the important experimental games that
ultimately led many people to realize that the self-interest hypothesis is problematic was the so-
called Ultimatum Game invented by Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982). In addition, the
Gift Exchange Game, the Trust Game, the Dictator Game and Public Good Games played an
important role in weakening the exclusive reliance on the self-interest hypothesis. All these
games share the feature of simplicity. Because they are so simple, they are easy to understand for
the experimental subjects and this makes inferences about subjects’ motives more convincing.
In the Ultimatum Game (UG) a pair of subjects has to agree on the division of a fixed sum
of money. Person A, the Proposer, can make one proposal of how to divide the amount. Person B,
the Responder, can accept or reject the proposed division. In the case of rejection, both receive
nothing; in the case of acceptance, the proposal is implemented. Under the standard assumptions that
(i) both the Proposer and the Responder are rational /'4 care only about how much money they get
and (ii) that the Proposer knows that the Responder is rational and selfish, the subgame perfect
equilibrium prescribes a rather extreme outcome: The Responder accepts /', positive amount of
money and, hence, the Proposer gives the Responder the smallest money unit, ε, and keeps the rest.
A robust result in the UG, across hundreds of experiments, is that proposals offering the
Responder less than 20 percent of the available surplus are rejected with probability 0.4 to 0.6. In
addition, the probability of rejection is decreasing in the size of the offer (see, e.g., Güth,
Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982; Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Roth, 1995, and the references
                                                
2 Smith’s results were eventually published in the Journal of Political Economy in 1962, after time consuming
debates with the referees. It is also ironical that Smith‘s initial aim was „to do a more credible job of rejecting
competitive price theory“ than Chamberlin (1948).
6therein). Apparently, many Responders do not behave in a self-interest maximizing manner. In
general, the motive indicated for the rejection of positive, yet "low", offers is that subjects view them
as unfair. A further robust result is that many Proposers seem to anticipate that low offers will be
rejected with a high probability. This is suggested, for example, by the comparison of the results of
Dictator Games (DG) and Ultimatum Games. In a DG the Responder’s option to reject is removed –
the Responder must accept any proposal. Forsythe et al. (1994) were the first who compared the
offers in UGs and DGs. They report that offers are substantially higher in the UG which suggests
that many Proposers do apply backwards induction. This interpretation is also supported by the
surprising observation of Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir, 1991, who showed that the
modal offer in the UG tends to maximize the expected income of the Proposer.3
The UG shows that a sizeable fraction of Responders is willing to punish behavior that is
perceived as unfair. In contrast, the Gift Exchange Game (GEG) indicates that a substantial fraction
of the Responders are willing to reward actions that are perceived as generous or fair. The first GEG
has been conducted by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993). In the GEG the Proposer offers an
amount of money 5 ∈ [ 565 ], 5≥ 0, which can be interpreted as a wage payment, to the
Responder. The Responder can accept or reject 5. In case of a rejection both players receive zero
payoff; in case of acceptance the Responder has to make a costly “effort” choice " ∈ [ "6" ],"  > 0.
The monetary payoff for the Proposer is 0 *7*3"*8*5 while the Responder’s payoff is 0 *7*5*8*19":
where 3 denotes the marginal value of effort for the Proposer and 19": the strictly increasing effort
cost schedule.4 Under the standard assumptions (i) and (ii) above the Responder will always choose
the lowest feasible effort level "  and will, in equilibrium, never reject any 5. Therefore, the
subgame perfect proposal is the lowest feasible wage level 5 .
The GEG captures a principal-agent relation with highly incomplete contracts in a stylized
way. Variants of the GEG have been conducted by several authors.5 All of these studies report that
the mean effort is, in general, positively related to the offered wage which is consistent with the
interpretation that the Responders, on average, reward generous wage offers with generous effort
                                                
3 Suleiman (1996) reports the results of UGs with varying degrees of veto power. In these games a rejection meant that λ
percent of the cake was destroyed. For example, if λ*= 0.86 and the Proposer offered a 9:1 division of $10, a rejection
implied that the Proposer received $1.8 while the Responder received $0.2. Suleiman reports that Proposers’ offers are
strongly increasing in λ.
4 In some applications of this game the Proposer’s payoff was given by 0 *7*93*8*5:";*This formulation rules out that
Proposers can make losses when they offer generously high wages. Likewise, in some applications of the GEG the
Responder did not have the option to reject 5. Thus, the Proposer just sent 5 while the Responder choose an effort level.
Under the standard assumptions of rationality and selfishness the subgame perfect equilibrium is, however, not affected
by these differences.
5 See, e. g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993, 1998), Charness (1996, 2000), Fehr and Falk, (1999), Gächter and Falk
(1999), Falk, Gächter and Kovacs (1999), Hannan, Kagel and Moser (1999) and Brandts and Charness (1999).
7choices. However, as in the case of the UG, there are considerable individual differences among the
Responders. While there typically is a sizeable fraction of Responders (frequently roughly 40
percent, sometimes more than 50 percent) who exhibit a reciprocal effort pattern, there is also a
substantial fraction of Responders who always make purely selfish effort choices or whose choices
seem to deviate randomly from the self-interested action. Despite the presence of selfish Responders
the relation between average effort and wages is in general sufficiently steep to render a high wage
policy profitable. This induces Proposers to pay wages far above 5 . Evidence for this interpretation
comes from Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl who embedded the GEG into an experimental market. In
addition to the embedded GEG – there was a control condition in which the effort level was
exogenously fixed by the experimenter. Note that in the control condition the Responders can no
longer reward generous wages with high effort levels. It turns out that the average wage is
substantially reduced when the effort is exogenously fixed.
Another important game that did much to change the exclusive reliance on the self-interest
hypothesis was the Trust Game (TG), first studied by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). In a TG a
Proposer receives an amount of money , from the experimenter, and then can send between zero
and , to the Responder. The experimenter then triples the amount sent, which we term <, so that the
Responder has =<. The Responder is then free to return anything between zero and 3< to the
Proposer. It turns out that many Proposers send money and that many Responders give back some
money. Moreover, there is frequently a strong correlation between < and the amount sent back at the
individual as well as at the aggregate level (see e.g., Miller 1997, Fahr and Irlenbusch 2000, Cox
2000).
Finally, we briefly consider the evidence on Public Good Games (PGGs). Like the GEG the
PGG is not only important because it provides interesting insights into the nature of non-pecuniary
motivations but it also captures the essence of numerous real world situations. There is by now a
huge experimental literature on PGGs (see Ledyard, 1995, Dawes and Thaler 1988 for surveys). In
the typical experiment there are ' players who simultaneously decide how much of their endowment
to contribute to a public good. Player &’s monetary payoff is given by 0 *7*, *8*> *?*@Σ>  where ,  is
player i’s endowment, >  her contribution, @ the monetary payoff per unit of the public good and Σ>
the amount of the public good provided by all players. The unit payoff @ obeys @ < 1 < '@. This
ensures that it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing to the public good although the total
surplus would be maximized if all players contributed their whole endowment.6 In many
experiments the PGG is repeated for about 10 periods where in each period the group composition
                                                
6 Typically, endowments are identical and ' ≤ 10 but there are also experiments with a group size of 40 and 100 (Isaac,
Walker and Williams 1994).
8changes randomly. If we restrict attention to behavior in the final period (in order to abstract from
repeated games or learning effects) it turns out that roughly 75 percent of all subjects contribute
nothing to the public good and the rest contributes very little.7
If one adds to the PGG the opportunity to punish other group members the contribution
pattern changes radically (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In a PGG with a punishment option there are
two stages. Stage one is identical to the above described PGG. At stage two, after every player in the
group has been informed about the contributions of each group member, each player can assign up
to ten punishment points to each of the other players. The assignment of one punishment point
reduces the first-stage income of the punished subject by 3 points on average but it also reduces the
income of the punisher according to a strictly increasing and convex cost schedule. Note that since
punishment is costly for the punisher, the self-interest hypothesis predicts zero punishment.
Moreover, since rational players will anticipate this, the self-interest hypothesis predicts that nobody
will contribute, i.e., there should be no difference in the contribution behavior between the usual
PGG and a PGG with a punishment opportunity. The experimental evidence is, however, completely
at odds with this prediction. While in the usual PGG cooperation is close to zero in the final period,
the punishment opportunity causes, on average, stable cooperation rates around 75 percent of
subjects’ endowment.8 The reason for these huge differences in contribution behavior is that in the
punishment condition many cooperators punish the free-riders. The more a subject deviates from the
average contribution of the other group members the more it is punished. Thus, the willingness to
punish “unfair” behavior is not restricted to the UG.
The above mentioned facts in the UG, the GEG, the TG and the PGG are now well
established and there is little disagreement about them. But there are, of course, questions about
which factors change the behavior in these games. For example, a question that routinely comes up
in discussions with economists is whether a rise in the stake level will eventually induce subjects to
behave in a self-interested manner. There are several papers examining this question (Hoffman
McCabe and Smith 1995, Fehr and Tougareva 1995, Slonim and Roth 1998, Cameron 1999). The
surprising answer is that relatively large increases in the monetary stakes did nothing or little to
change behavior. Hoffman, McCabe and Smith could not detect any effect of the stake level in their
                                                
7 At the beginning of a repeated PGG subjects contribute on average between 40 and 60 percent of their endowment
but towards the end contributions are typically very low. This pattern may be due to repeated game effects. Another
plausible reason for the decay of cooperation is that many subjects are conditional cooperators as shown by Croson
(1999), Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (1999) and Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman (1999). Conditional cooperators
cease to cooperate once they notice that selfish subjects take advantage of their cooperation.
8 If the same subjects are allowed to stay together for ten periods the cooperation rate even climbs to 90 percent of
subjects’ endowments &'* (+"* $&'/#* -")&.4. In Fehr and Gächter (2000) the group size was ' = 4. Recently, Carpenter
(2000) showed that with a group size of ' = 10 subjects achieve almost $2## co-operation even with a random group
composition over time.
9UGs. Fehr and Tougareva conducted GEGs (embedded in a competitive exerimental market) in
Moscow. In one condition the subjects earned, on average, the equivalent amount of the income of
one week in the experiment. In another condition they earned the equivalent of a ten weeks’ income.
Despite this large difference in the stake size there are no significant differences across conditions in
the behavior of both the Proposers and the Responders. Slonim and Roth conducted UGs in
Slovakia. They found a small interaction effect between experience and the stake level. In the final
period of a series of one-shot UGs the Responders in the high-stake condition (with a 10-fold
increase in the stake level relative to the low stake condition) seem to be willing to reject a bit less
frequently. Fehr and Tougareva also allowed subjects to repeat the game (with randomly matched
partners). They found no such interaction effects. Cameron conducted UGs in Indonesia and – in the
high stake condition - subjects could earn the equivalent of  three months’ income in her experiment.
She observed no effect of the stake level on Proposers’ behavior and a slight reduction of the
rejection probability when stakes were high.
Of course, it is still possible that in the presence of extremely high stakes there may be a shift
towards more selfish behavior. However, for large segments of the population this is not the
economically relevant question. For almost all people the vast majority of their decisions involves
stake levels well below three months’ income. Thus, even if fairness-driven behavior would play no
role at all at stake levels above that size, fairness concerns would still play a major role in many
economically important domains.
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While there is now little disagreement regarding the facts, there is still disagreement about
the interpretation of these facts. In Section 3 we will describe several recently developed theories of
fairness that maintain the rationality assumption but change the assumption of purely selfish
preferences. Some researchers have, however, reservations about changes in the motivational
assumptions and prefer, instead, to interpret the behavior in these games as elementary forms of
bounded rationality. For example, Roth and Erev (1995) and Binmore, Gale and Samuelson (1995)
try to explain the presence of fair offers and rejections of low offers in the UG by learning models
that are based on purely pecuniary preferences. These models are based on the idea that the rejection
of low offers is not very costly for the Responder and, therefore, the Responders learn only very
slowly not to reject such offers. The rejection of offers is, however, quite costly for the Proposers.
Therefore, Proposers learn more quickly that it does not pay to make low offers. Moreover, since
Proposers quickly learn to make fair offers, the pressure on the Responders to learn accepting low
10
offers is greatly reduced. This gives rise to very slow convergence to the subgame perfect
equilibrium – if there is convergence at all. The simulations of Roth and Erev and Binmore, Gale
and Samuelson show that it often takes thousands of iterations until play comes close to the standard
prediction.
In our view there can be little doubt that learning processes are important in real life as well
as in laboratory experiments. There are numerous examples where the behavior of subjects changes
over time and it seems clear that learning models are prime candidates to explain such dynamic
patterns. We believe, however, that attempts to explain the basic facts in such simple games as the
UG, the GEG and the TG in terms of learning models that assume completely selfish preferences are
misplaced. The decisions of the Responders, in particular, are so simple in these games that it is
difficult to believe that they make systematic mistakes and reject money or reward generous offers
although their true preferences would require them not to do so. Moreover, the above cited evidence
from Roth et al. (1991) Forsythe et al (1995), Suleiman (1996) and Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl
(1998) suggests that many Proposers do anticipate Responders’ actions surprisingly well. Thus, at
least in these simple two-stage games, many Proposers seem to be quite rational and forward
looking.
Sometimes it is also argued that the behavior in these games is due to a social norm (see, e.
g., Binmore 1998). In real life, so the argument goes, experimental subjects make the bulk of their
decisions in repeated interactions. It is well known that in repeated interactions the rejection of
unfair offers or the rewarding of generous offers can be sustained as an equilibrium. According to
this argument, notions of fairness perform the function of selecting a particular equilibrium among
the infinitely many equilibria that typically exist in long-term interactions. Subjects’ behavior is,
therefore, adapted to repeated interactions and they tend to apply behavioral rules, that are
appropriate in the context of repeated interactions, erroneously to laboratory one-shot games. This
argument essentially boils down to the claim that subjects cannot rationally distinguish between one-
shot and repeated interactions. One problem with this argument – apart from claiming that subjects
make systematic mistakes – is that it cannot explain the huge behavioral variations across one-shot
games. Why do in Forsythe et al. (1995) the Proposers give so much less in the DG compared to the
UG? Why do the Proposers in the control condition with exogenously fixed effort (Fehr,
Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1998) make so low wage offers? Why is there so much defection in the final
round of PGGs while in the presence of a punishment opportunity a high level of co-operation can
be achieved? Invoking some kind of social norm cannot explain this behavior unless one is willing
to assume that different social norms apply to these different situations. A second problem with the
above argument is that there is compelling evidence that in repeated interactions experimental
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subjects do behave very differently compared to one-shot situations. In Gächter and Falk (1999) it is
shown that the Responders in GEGs put forward much higher effort levels if they can stay together
with the same Proposer.9 In fact, experimental subjects who participate in one-shot GEGs frequently
complain after the experiment that the experimenter ruled out repeated interactions because that
would have enabled them, so the subjects’ claim, to develop a much more trustful and efficient
relation with their partner. All this indicates that experimental subjects are well aware of the
difference between one-shot interactions and repeated interactions.
The above arguments suggest that an approach that combines bounded rationality with
purely selfish preferences does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the facts observed in UGs,
GEGs, TGs and PGGs. In our view, there remain two plausible approaches to account for the facts.
One approach is to maintain the assumption of rationality at least for the analysis of these simple
games and to assume, in addition, that some players are not only motivated by pecuniary forces. The
other approach is, to combine models of learning with models that take into account non-selfish
motives. In the following we focus on the first approach because there has been much progress in
this area in recent years,  while the second approach is still in its infancy.10
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This section surveys the most prominent recent attempts to explain the experimental evidence
sketched in Section 2 within a rational choice framework. Two main approaches can be
distinguished. The first approach assumes that at least some agents have “social preferences”, i.e.,
the utility function of these agents does not only depend on the own material payoff but also on
how much the other players receive. Given these social preferences all agents are assumed to
behave perfectly rational and the well known concepts of traditional utility and game theory can
be applied to analyze optimal behavior and to characterize equilibrium outcomes in experimental
games. The second approach focuses on “intention-based reciprocity”. This approach assumes
that a player cares about the intentions of her opponent. If she feels treated kindly, she wants to
return the favor and be nice to her opponent. If she feels treated badly, she wants to hurt her
opponent. Thus, in this approach it is crucial how a player interprets the behavior of the other
players. This cannot be captured by traditional game theory but requires the framework of
psychological game theory.
                                                
9 Andreoni and Miller (1993) also report that in Prisonners‘ Dilemmas increases in the probability of staying together
or meeting the same partner again increase cooperation rates.
10 An exemption is the recent paper by Cooper and Stockman (1999) that combines reenforcement learning with a
model of social preferences and the paper by Costa-Gomes and Zauner (1999).
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The starting point of both of these approaches is to make rather specific assumptions on
the utility functions of the players. Alternatively, one could start from a general preference
relation and ask what kind of axioms are necessary and sufficient to generate utility functions
with certain properties. Axiomatic approaches are discussed at the end of this section.
E<D :)0,%/'!"#(#"#-0#2
Classical utility theory assumes that a decision maker has preferences over allocations of material
outcomes (e.g. goods) and that these preferences satisfy some “rationality” or “consistency”
requirements, such as completeness and transitivity. However, in almost all applications this
fairly general framework is interpreted much more narrowly by implicitly assuming that the
decision maker only cares about one aspect of an allocation, namely the material resources that
are allocated to her. Models of social preferences assume, in contrast, that the decision maker
may also care about how much material resources are allocated to others.
Somewhat more formally, let AB6C6;;;6DE denote a set of individuals and 0790 60 6;;;60 :
denote an allocation of physical resources out of some set F of feasible allocations, where 0
denotes the material resources allocated to person &. The self-interest hypothesis says that the
utility of individual & depends on 0 *only. We will say that individual & has !.1&/#*-)"$")"'1"! if
for any given 0 *person &'s utility is affected by variations of 0 , G≠&. Of course, simply assuming
that the utility of individual & may be any function of the total allocation is too general because it
does not yield any empirically testable restrictions on observed behavior. In the following we will
discuss several models of social preferences, each of which assumes that the preferences of an
individual depend on 0 , G≠&, in a different way.
E<D<D =/*"1,25
A person is altruistic, if the first partial derivatives of 290 6;;;60 : with respect to 0 6;;;60  are
strictly positive, i.e., if her utility increases with the well being of other people.11 The hypothesis
that people are altruistic has a long tradition in economics and has been used to explain charitable
donations and the voluntary provision of public goods (see, e.g., Becker, 1974).
                                                
11 The Encyclopaedia Britannica (1998, 15th edition) defines an altruistic agent as someone who feels the obligation
“to further the pleasures and alleviate the pains of other people”. Note that our definition of altruism differs
somewhat from the definition used in moral philosophy, where “altruism” requires a moral agent to be concerned
.'#, about the welfare of others and not about his own happiness.
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Clearly, the simplest game to elicit altruistic preferences, is the Dictator Game. Adreoni
and Miller (2000) conducted a series of DG experiments in which one agent could allocate
“tokens” between herself and another agent for a series of different budgets. The tokens were
exchanged into money at different rates for the two agents and the different budgets. Let H 90 60 :
denote subject &'s utility function representing her preferences over monetary allocations 90 60 :;
In a first step Adreoni and Miller check for violations of the General Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP) and find that almost all subjects behaved consistently and passed this basic
rationality check. Then they classify the subjects into three main groups. They find that about 30
percent of the subjects give tokens to the other party in a fashion that equalizes the monetary
payoffs between players. The behavior of 20 percent of the subjects can be explained by a utility
function in which 0  and 0  are perfect substitutes, i.e., these subjects seem to have maximized the
(weighted) sum of the monetary payoffs. However, there are also almost 50 percent of the
subjects who behaved “selfishly” and did not give any significant amounts to the other party.
Andreoni and Miller (2000, p.23) conclude that altruistic behavior exists and that it is consistent
with rationality, but also that individuals are heterogeneous.
Charness and Rabin (2000) consider a specific form of altruism which they call I2/!&%
@/0&@&'*-)"$")"'1"!. They start from a “disinterested social welfare function” which is a convex
combination of Rawls' maximin criterion and a utilitarian welfare function:
J90 60 6;;;60 :7δ⋅@&'A0 6;;;60 E?9B%δ:⋅90 ?;;;?0 :
where δ∈9K6B: is a parameter reflecting the weight that is put on the maximin criterion. The
utility function of an individual is then given by a convex combination of his own monetary
payoff and the above social welfare function:12
H 90 60 6;;;60 :79B%γ:0 ?γLδ⋅@&'A0 6;;;60 E?9B%δ:⋅90 ?;;;?0 :M .
In the two player case this boils down to
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12 Note that Charness and Rabin do not normalize payoffs with respect to D. Thus, if the group size changes, and the
parameters δ and γ are assumed to be constant, the importance of the maximin term in relation to the player’s own
material payoff changes.
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Note that the marginal rate of substitution between 0  and 0  is smaller if 0 <0 . Hence, the
decision maker cares about the well being of the other person, but less so if the other person is
better off than she is.
Altruism in general and quasi-maximin preferences, in particular, can explain positive acts
to other players, such as giving in Dictator Games, voluntary contributions in Public Good
Games, and the kind behavior of Responders in trust and Gift Exchange Games,13 but it is clearly
inconsistent with the fact that in some experiments subjects try to retaliate and hurt other subjects
even if this is costly for them (as in the ultimatum game or a public good game with
punishments). This is why Charness and Rabin augment quasi-maximin preferences by
incorporating reciprocity (see Section 3.2.3 below).
E<D<F N#/%*,.#'L-0)5#'%-&'4-.;
An alternative hypothesis is that subjects are concerned not only about the absolute amount of
money they receive but also about their relative standing compared to others. This “relative
income hypothesis” has a long tradition in economics and goes back at least to Veblen (1922).
Bolton (1991) formalized this idea in the context of an experimental bargaining game between
two players and assumed that H 90 60 :72 90 60 N0 ),  where 29⋅6⋅:  is strictly increasing in its first
argument and where the partial derivative with respect to 0 N0  is strictly positive for * 0 O0  and
equal to 0 for 0 ≥0 . Thus, agent & suffers if she gets less than player G, but she does not care about
player G if she is better off herself. Note that this utility function implies that ∂H N∂*0 ≤K, just the
opposite of altruism. Hence, while this utility function is consistent with the behavior in the
bargaining games considered by Bolton, it fails to explain giving in dictator, gift exchange and
trust games or voluntary contributions in public good games. The same problem arises in the
envy-approach of Kirchsteiger (1994).
                                                
13 However, even in these games altruism has some implausible implications. For example, in a public good context,
altruism implies that if the government provides part of the public good (financed by taxes) then every Dollar
provided by the government “crowds out” one Dollar of private, voluntary contributions. This “neutrality property”
holds quite generally (Bernheim, 1986). However, it is in contrast to the empirical evidence reporting that the actual
crowding out is rather small. This has lead some researchers to include the pleasure of giving (a “warm glow effect”)
in the utility function (Andreoni, 1989).
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The preceding approaches assumed that utility is either monotonically increasing or
monotonically decreasing in the well being of other players. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume
that a player is altruistic towards other players if their material payoffs are below an equitable
benchmark, but she feels envy when the material payoffs of the other players exceed this level.14
In most experiments it is natural to assume that an equitable allocation is an equal monetary
payoff for all players. Fehr and Schmidt consider the simplest utility function capturing this idea.
H 90 6;;;60 :*7*0 %*[α N9D%B:]@/0Σ ≠ A0 %0 6KE*%*[β N9D%B:]@/0Σ ≠ A0 80 6KE;
with β ≤α  and β ≤B; Note that ∂H N∂*0 ≥K if and only if 0 ≥0 . Note also that the disutility from
inequality is larger if another person is better off than player & than if another person is worse off
(α≥β ).
This utility function can rationalize positive /'4 negative actions towards other players. It
is consistent with giving in dictator, gift exchange and trust games, /'4 with the rejection of low
offers in ultimatum games. It can also explain voluntary contributions in public good games /'4
the costly punishment of free-riders.
A second important ingredient of this model is the assumption that individuals are
heterogeneous. If all people were alike, it would be difficult to explain why we observe that
people sometimes resist “unfair” outcomes or manage to cooperate even though it is a dominant
strategy for a selfish person not to do so, while in other environments fairness concerns or the
desire to cooperate do not seem to have much of an effect. Fehr-Schmidt show that the interaction
of the distribution of types with the strategic environment explains why in some situations very
unequal outcomes are obtained while in other situations very egalitarian outcomes prevail. For
example, in certain competitive environments (see, e.g., the ultimatum game with Proposer
competition in Section 5.1) even a population that consists .'#, of very fair types (high αP! and
βP!) cannot prevent very uneven outcomes. The reason is that none of the inequity averse players
can enforce a more equitable outcome through her own actions. In contrast, in a public good
game with punishment, a small fraction of inequity averse players is sufficient to credibly
threaten that free riders will be punished which induces selfish players to contribute to the public
good.
                                                
14 Daughety (1994) and Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1998) also assume that a player values the payoff of reference
agents positively, if she is relatively better off, while she values the others‘ payoff negatively, if she is relatively
worse off.
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Using the data that is available from many experiments on the ultimatum game, Fehr and
Schmidt calibrate the distribution of α and β in the population. Keeping this distribution constant,
they show that their model yields quantitatively accurate predictions across many bargaining,
market and co-operation games.15
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) independently developed a similar model of inequity
aversion. They also show that their model can explain a wide variety of seemingly puzzling
evidence like, e.g., giving in DGs and GEGs and rejections in UGs. In their model the utility
function is given by
H 7*H 90 6σ :
where
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For any given σ , the utility function is assumed to be weakly increasing and concave in player &’s
own material payoff 0 . Furthermore, for any given 0 , the utility function is strictly concave in
player &’s share of total income, σ , and obtains a maximum at σ7BND.16 Bolton and Ockenfels do
not pin down a specific functional form, so their utility function is more flexible. However, this
also makes it more difficult to get closed form solutions and quantitative predictions for the
outcomes of many experiments. It also imposes less discipline on the researcher not to adjust the
utility function to a specific set of data.
For two-player-games Fehr-Schmidt and Bolton-Ockenfels often yield qualitatively
similar results. With more than two players there are some interesting differences. In this case
                                                
15 One drawback of the piece-wise linear utility function employed by Fehr and Schmidt is that it implies corner
solutions for some games where interior solutions are frequently observed. For example, in the dictator game, a
decision maker with a Fehr-Schmidt utility function would either give nothing (if her βOK;Q) or share the pie equally
(if βRK;Q). Giving away a fraction that is strictly in between K and K;Q is optimal only in the non-generic case where
β7K;Q. However, this problem can be avoided by assuming non-linear inequity aversion.
16 This specification of the utility function has the disadvantage that it is not independent of a shift in payoffs.
Consider, for example, a dictator game in which the dictator has to divide F Dollars. Note that this is a constant sum
game because *0 ?0 ≡*F. If we reduce the sum of payoffs by F, i.e., if the dictator can take away money from her
opponent or give to him out of her own pocket, then 0 ?0 7*K for any decision of the dictator and thus we always
have σ 7σ =1/2. Therefore, the theory makes the implausible prediction that, in contrast to the game where 0 ?0 7
F*R*K, /## dictators should take as much money from their opponent as possible. A related problem has been noted by
Camerer (1999, p. 61). Suppose that the ultimatum game is modified as follows: If the Responder rejects a proposal
the Proposer receives a small amount εRK*while the Responder receives zero.*In this game the rejection of a -.!&(&3"
offer implies σ7K while acceptance implies σRK;*Thus, the Responder never rejects any positive offer no matter how
small εRK.
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Fehr and Schmidt assume that a player compares herself to each of her opponents separately.
This implies, that her behavior towards an opponent depends on the income difference towards
this person. In contrast, Bolton and Ockenfels assume that the decision maker is not concerned
about each individual opponent but only about the average income of all players. Thus, whether
∂H N∂0  is positive or negative in the Bolton-Ockenfels model does not depend on G’s relative
position towards &, but rather on how well & does as compared to the average. If 0  is below the
average, then &*would like to reduce G’s income even if G has a much lower income than & herself.
On the other hand, if & is doing better than the average, then she is prepared to give to G even if G is
much better off than &.17
E<D<H'' =/*"1,25'%-&':$,*#(1/-#22
Levine (1998) offers a different solution to explain giving in some games and punishing in
others. Consider the utility function
H70 ?Σ ≠ 0 9/ ?λ/ :N9B?λ:
where K≤λ≤B and %BO/ OB for all &∈AB6;;;6DE. Suppose first that λ7K. In this case the utility
function reduces to H70 ?/ *Σ ≠ 0 . If / RK, then person & is an altruist who wants to promote the
well being of other people, if / OK, then player & is spiteful. While this utility function would be
able to explain why some people contribute in public good games and why some (other) people
reject positive offers in the ultimatum game, it cannot explain why the same person who is
altruistic in one setting is spiteful in another. To deal with this problem, suppose that  λRK. In this
case an altruistic player & (with / RK) feels more altruistic towards another altruist than towards a
spiteful person. In fact, if -λ/ R/  player & may behave spitefully herself. In most experiments,
where there is anonymous interaction, the players do not know the parameter /  of their
opponents and have to form beliefs about them. Thus, any sequential game becomes a signaling
game in which beliefs about the other players’ types are crucially important to determine optimal
strategies. This may give rise to a multiplicity of signaling equilibria.
Levine uses the data from the ultimatum game to calibrate the distribution of / and to
estimate  λ (which is assumed to be the same for all players). He shows that with these
parameters the model can reasonably fit the data on centipete games, market games, and public
good games. However, because / OB, the model cannot explain positive giving in the dictator
game.
                                                
17 See Camerer (1999) and Section 4.1 for a more extensive comparison of these two approaches.
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Models of social preferences share a common weakness. They assume that players are only
concerned about the distributional consequences of their acts but not about the intentions that
lead their opponents to choose these acts. To see that this may be a problem consider the
following two “mini-ultimatum games” in which the strategy set of the Proposer is restricted. In
the first condition the Proposer can choose between a 50:50 and an 80:20 split. In the second
condition the Proposer must choose between an 80:20 and a 20:80 division of the pie. All theories
that look only at the distributional consequences must predict that if a Responder rejects the
80:20 split in the first condition, then she must also reject this offer in the second condition.
However, in the second condition a fair division of the pie was not feasible and so the Responder
may be more inclined to accept this offer as compared to the first treatment where the Proposer
could have split the pie evenly but chose not to do so. In fact, Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2000a)
report that the 80:20 split is rejected significantly less often under the second condition.18 This is
inconsistent with any theory of social preferences that rely only on preferences over income
distributions.
E<F<D'' M%,"-#22'4R1,/,>",15
In a pioneering article, Rabin (1993) starts from the observation that our behavior is often a
reaction to the (expected) &'("'(&.'! of other people. If we feel that another person has been kind
to us, we often have a desire to be kind as well. If we feel that somebody wanted to hurt us, we
often have the desire to retaliate even if this is personally costly.
In order to model intentions explicitly, Rabin departs from traditional game theory and
adopts the concept of “psychological game theory” that had been introduced by Geanakoplos,
Pearce and Stacchetti (1989). In psychological game theory, utilities do not only depend on
terminal-node payoffs but also on players' beliefs. Rabin restricts attention to two-player, normal
form games. Let S  and S  denote the (mixed) strategy sets for players 1 and 2, respectively, and
let xi: S ×S →TU* be player &'s material payoff function.
                                                
18 This criticism does not necessarily apply to Levine (1998). In his model, offering 80:20 may be interpreted as a
signal that the Proposer is spiteful if the 50:50 split was available, and may be differently interpreted if the 50:50
split was not available. However, if a player knows the type of her opponent, her behavior is independent of what the
opponent does to her and of why he does it to her.
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We now have to define (hierarchies of) beliefs over strategies. Let /∈S  denote a strategy
of player &. When &* chooses her strategy she must have some belief about the strategy to be
chosen by player G. In all of the following &∈AB6CE and G7=%&. Let V  denote player &’s belief about
what player G is going to do. Furthermore, in order to rationalize her expectation V , player & must
have some belief about what player G believes that player &*is going to do. This belief about beliefs
is denoted by 1 . The hierarchy of beliefs could be continued ad infinitum, but the first two levels
of beliefs are sufficient to define reciprocal preferences.
Rabin starts with a “kindness function”, $ 9/ 6V :, which measures how kind player & is to
player G. If player & believes that her opponent chooses strategy V , then she chooses effectively
her opponents payoff out of the set L0 9V :60 9V :M where 0 9V :* 90 9V :: is the lowest (highest)
payoff of player G*that can be induced by player & if G*chooses V . According to Rabin, a “fair” or
“equitable” payoff for player G, 0 9V :, is just the average of the lowest and highest payoffs
(excluding Pareto-dominated payoffs, however). Note that this “fair” payoff is independent of the
payoff of player &. The kindness of player & towards player G is measured by the difference
between the actual payoff she gives to player G and the “fair” payoff, relative to the whole range
of feasible payoffs:19
$ 9/ 6V :≡L0 9V 6/ :%0 9V :MNL0 9V :%0 9V :M
with G7=%& and $ 9/ 6*V :7K if 0 9V :%0 9V :7K; Note that $ 9/ 6*V :RK  if and only if player & gives
player G*more than the “fair” payoff.
Finally, we have to define player &'s belief about how kind she is being treated by player G.
This is defined in  exactly the same manner, but beliefs have to move up one level. Thus, if
player &*beliefs that player G*chooses V  and if she believes that player G believes that & chooses 1 ,
then player &*perceives player G's kindness as given by:
$ P9V 61 :≡L0 91 6V :80 91 :MNL0 91 :80 91 :M
with G7=%& and $ 9V 6*1 :7K if 0 91 :80 91 :*7*K; These kindness functions can now be used to define
a player's utility function:
H 9/6V 61 :70 9/6*V :?$ P9V 6*1 :LB?$ 9/ 6V :M*6
                                                
19 A disturbing feature of Rabin’s formulation is that he excludes Pareto-dominated payoffs in the definition of the
“fair” payoff, but not in the denominator of the kindness term. Thus, adding a Pareto-dominated strategy for player G
would not affect the fair payoff but it would reduce the kindness term.
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where /79/ 6/ :; Note that if player G is perceived to be unkind 9$ P9⋅:OK:, player & wants to be as
unkind as possible, too. On the other hand, if $ P9⋅:* is positive, player & gets some additional utility
from being kind to player G as well. Note also, that the kindness terms have no dimension and that
they must lie in the interval* L%B6K;QM. Thus, the utility function is sensitive to positive affine
transformations. Furthermore, the kindness term becomes less and less important the higher the
material payoffs are.
A “fairness equilibrium” is an equilibrium in a psychological game with these payoff
functions, i.e., a pair of strategies 9/ 6/ : that are mutually best responses to each other and a set
of rational expectations V79V 6V : and 1791 61 :*that are consistent with equilibrium play.
Rabin’s theory is important because it was the first contribution that made the notion of
reciprocity precise and explored the consequences of reciprocal behavior. The model provides
several interesting insights, but it is not well suited for predictive purposes. It is consistent with
rejections in the UG but there exist many other unreasonable equilibria including equilibria in
which the Responders receives more than 50 percent of the pie. The multiplicity of equilibria is a
general feature of Rabin’s model. If material payoffs are sufficiently small so that psychological
payoffs matter, then there are always multiple equilibria. In particular, there is one equilibrium in
which both players are nice to each other and one in which they are nasty. Both equilibria are
supported by self-fulfilling prophecies, so it is difficult to predict which equilibrium is going to
be played.
The theory also predicts that players do not undertake kind actions unless others have
shown their kind intentions. Suppose, for example, that in the prisoners' dilemma player 2 has no
choice but is forced to cooperate. If player 1 knows this, then - according to Rabin's theory - she
will interpret player 2's cooperation as “neutral” 9$ P9⋅:7K:. Thus, she will only look at her
material payoffs and will defect. This contrasts with models inequity aversion where player 2
would co-operate irrespective of the reason for player 1’s co-operation. We will discuss the
experimental evidence that can be used to discriminate between the different approaches in
Section 4 below.
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Rabin's theory has been defined only for two person, normal form games. If the theory is applied
to the normal form of simple sequential games, some very implausible equilibria may arise. For
example, in the sequential prisoners' dilemma, unconditional cooperation of the second player is
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part of a “fairness” equilibrium. The reason is that Rabin's equilibrium notion does not force
player 2 to behave optimally off the equilibrium path.
In a subsequent paper, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) generalized Rabin's theory to
D%person extensive form games for which they introduce the notion of a “Sequential Reciprocity
Equilibrium” (SRE). The main innovation is to keep track of beliefs about intentions as the game
evolves. In particular, it has to be specified how beliefs about intentions are formed off the
equilibrium path. Given this system of beliefs, strategies have to form a fairness equilibrium in
every proper subgame.20 Applying their model to several examples Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
show that 1.'4&(&.'/# cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma is a SRE. They also show that it can
be a SRE in the ultimatum game that the Proposer makes an offer that is rejected by the
Responder with certainty. This is an equilibrium because both players believe that the other party
wants to hurt them. However, even in these extremely simple sequential games the equilibrium
analysis is fairly complex, and there are typically many equilibria with different equilibrium
outcomes due to different self-fulfilling beliefs about intentions.
E<F<E''' S#"9,-9'L-*#-*,)-2'%-&':)0,%/'!"#(#"#-0#2
Falk and Fischbacher (1999) also generalize Rabin (1993). They consider D-person extensive
form games and allow for the possibility of incomplete information. Furthermore, they measure
“kindness” in terms of inequity aversion. A strategy of player G  is perceived to be kind by player
& if it gives rise to a payoff for player & which is higher than the payoff of player G. Note that this is
fundamentally different from Rabin and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger who define “kindness” in
relation to the feasible payoffs of player & and not in relation to the payoff that player G gets.
Furthermore, Falk and Fischbacher distinguish whether an unequal distribution could have been
altered by player G or whether player G was a “dummy player” who is unable to affect the
distribution by his actions. In the former case the kindness term gets a higher weight than in the
latter. However, even if player G is a dummy player who has no choice to make, the kindness term
                                                
20 Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger also suggest several other deviations from Rabin’s model. In particular, they measure
kindness “in proportion to the size of the gift” (i.e. in monetary units). This has the advantage that reciprocity does
not disappear as the stakes become larger, but it also implies that the kindness term in the utility function has the
dimension of “money squared” which again makes the utility function sensitive to linear transformations.
Furthermore, they define “inefficient strategies” (which play an important role in the definition of the kindness term)
as strategies that yield a weakly lower payoff for all players than some other strategy for all subgames. Rabin (1993)
defines inefficient strategies as those which yield weakly less on the equilibrium path. However, with more than two
players in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) the problem arises that an additional dummy player may render an
inefficient strategy efficient and might thus affect the size of the kindness term.
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(which now reflects pure inequity aversion) gets a positive weight. Thus Falk and Fischbacher
merge intention based reciprocity and inequity aversion.
Their model is quite complex. At every node where player &  has to move, she has to
evaluate the kindness of player G which depends on the expected payoff difference between the
two players and on what player G could have done about this difference. This “kindness term” is
multiplied by a “reciprocation term”, which is positive if player & is kind to player G and negative
if & is unkind. The product is further multiplied by an individual reciprocity parameter which
measures the weight of player &’s desire to reciprocate as compared to his desire to get a higher
material payoff. These preferences together with the underlying game form define a
psychological game á la Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989). A subgame perfect
psychological Nash equilibrium of this game is called a “reciprocity equilibrium”.
Falk and Fischbacher show that there are parameter constellations for which their model is
consistent with the stylized facts of the ultimatum game, the gift exchange game, the dictator
game, and of public good and prisoners' dilemma games. Furthermore, there are parameter
constellations that can explain the difference in outcomes if one player moves intentionally and if
she is a dummy player. Because their model contains variants of a pure intentions based
reciprocity model (like Rabin) and a pure inequity aversion model (like Fehr and Schmidt or
Bolton and Ockenfels) as special cases it is possible to get a better fit of the data, but at a
significant cost in terms of the complexity of the model.
Another attempt to combine social preferences with intention based reciprocity is due to
Charness and Rabin (1999). We described their model of quasi-maximin preferences in Section
3.1.1 already. In a second step they augment these preferences by introducing a demerit profile
ρ≡9ρ 6;;;6ρ :, where ρ ∈LK6BM is a measure of how much player & deserves from the point of view
of all other players. The smaller ρ  the more does player & count in the utility function of the other
players. Given a demerit profile ρ, player &'s utility function is given by
H 90 60 6;;;60 Wρ:79B%γ:0 ?γLδ⋅@&'A0 6@&' ≠ A0 ?4ρ EE
?9B%δ:⋅90 ?Σ* ≠@/0AB%Xρ 6KE⋅0 :*8*$Σ ≠ ρ 0 M
where 46X6$≥K are three new parameters of the model. If 47X7$7K, this boils down to the quasi-
maximin preferences describes above. If 4 and X are large, then player & does not want to promote
the well being of player G. If f is large, player & may actually want to hurt player G.
The crucial step is to endogenize the demerit profile ρ. Charness and Rabin do this by
comparing player G's strategy to an unanimously agreed upon, exogenously given  “selfless
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standard” of behavior. The more player G falls short of this standard, the higher is his demerit
factor ρ .
A “reciprocal fairness equilibrium” (RFE) is a strategy profile and a demerit profile such
that each player is maximizing his utility function given other players' strategies and given the
demerit profile that is itself consistent with the profile of strategies. This definition implicitly
corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of a psychological game as defined by Geanakoplos, Pearce
and Stacchetti (1989).
The notion of RFE has several drawbacks that make it almost impossible to use it for the
analysis of even the simplest experimental games. First of all, the model is incomplete because
preferences are only defined in equilibrium (i.e., for an equilibrium demerit profile ρ) and it is
unclear how to evaluate outcomes out of equilibrium or if there are multiple equilibria. Second, it
requires that all players have the same utility functions and agree on a “quasi-maximin” social
welfare function in order to determine the demerit profile ρ. Finally, the model is so complicated
and involves so many free parameters that it would be very difficult to test it empirically.
Charness and Rabin show that if the “selfless standard” is sufficiently small, then every
RFE corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the game in which players simply maximize their
quasi-maximin utility functions. Therefore, in the analysis of the experimental evidence, they
restrict attention to the much simpler model of quasi-maximin preferences that we discussed in
Section 3.1.1 above.
E<E' =P,)5%*,0'=$$")%0+#2
The models considered so far assume very specific utility functions that are either defined on
(lotteries over) material payoff vectors and/or on beliefs about other players' strategies and other
players' beliefs. These utility functions are based on psychological plausibility yet most of them
lack an axiomatic foundation. Segal and Sobel (1999) take the opposite approach and ask what
kind of axioms generate preferences that can reflect fairness and reciprocity.
Their starting point is to assume that players have preferences over strategy profiles rather
than over material allocations. Consider a given two-player game and let Σ 6*&∈AB6CE6 denote the
space of (mixed) strategies of player &. For any strategy profile 9σ 6σ :∈Σ×Σ  let 3 9σ 6σ :*denote
player &'s material payoff function, assuming that these “selfish preferences” satisfy the von
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. However, the actual preferences of player & are given by a
preference relation !i,σj over her own strategies. Note that this preference relation depends on the
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strategy chosen by player G. Segal and Sobel show that if the preference relation !i,σ  satisfies the
independence axiom and if, for a given σ , player & prefers to get a higher material payoff for
herself if the payoff of player G* is held constant (self interest), then the preferences !i,σ  over Σ
can be represented by a utility function of the form21
2 9σ 6*σ *:*7*3 9σ 6σ :?/ σ 3 9σ σ ;
In standard game theory, / σ ≡K. Positive values of this coefficient mean that player &* has
altruistic preferences, negative values of / σ   mean that she is spitelful.
Note that the coefficient / σ   depends on σ . Therefore, whether a player is altruistic or
spiteful may depend on the strategy chosen by her opponent, so there is scope to model
reciprocity. In order to do so, Segal and Sobel introduce an additional axiom, called “reciprocal
altruism”. This axiom requires that when player G chooses a strategy σ  which player i likes better
than some other strategy σ P, then player & prefers strategies that give a higher payoff to player G.
Segal and Sobel show that this axiom implies that the coefficient / σ   varies with σ  such that
(other things being equal) the coefficient increases if and only if player j chooses a “nicer”
strategy.
The models of social preferences that we discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in
particular the models of altruism, relative income, inequity aversion, quasi-maximin preferences,
and altruism and spitefulness, can all be seen as special cases of a Segal-Sobel utility function.
Segal and Sobel can also capture some, but not all, aspects of intention based reciprocity. For
example, in Rabin’s (1993) model a player's utility did not only depend on the strategy chosen by
her opponent, but also on why he has chosen this strategy. This can be illustrated in the “Battle of
the Sexes” game. Player 1 may go to boxing, because she expects player 2 to go to boxing, too
(which is kind of player 2 given that he believes player 1 to go to boxing). Yet, she may also go
to boxing, because she expects player 2 to go to ballet (which is unkind of player 2 if he believes
player 1 to go to boxing) and which is punished by the boxing strategy of player 1. This effect
cannot be captured by Segal and Sobel, because in their framework preferences are defined on
strategies only.
Neilson (2000) provides an axiomatic characterization of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
model of inequity aversion. He introduces the axiom of “self-referent separability” which
requires that if the payoff differences between player & and any subset of all other players remain
                                                
21 The construction resembles that of Harsanyi's (1955) “utilitarian” social welfare function Σ α *2 . Note, however,
that Harsanyi's axiom of Pareto efficiency is stronger than the axiom of self interest employed here. Therefore, the
/ σ  in Segal and Sobel may be negative.
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constant, then the preferences of player & should not be affected by the magnitude of these
differences. Neilson shows that this axiom is equivalent to having a utility function that is
additively separable in the individual’s own material payoff and the payoff differences to his
opponents, which is an essential feature of the Fehr-Schmidt model. Neilson also offers a full
axiomatic characterization of the more specific functional form used by Fehr and Schmidt.
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Most theories discussed in Section 3 have been developed during the last few years and the
evidence to discriminate between these theories is still limited. As we will show, however, the
available data do exhibit some clear qualitative regularities that give a first indication of the
advantages and disadvantages of the different theories.22
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All theories of fairness and reciprocity are based on the idea that actors compare themselves with
a set of reference actors. To whom do people compare themselves? In bilateral interactions there
is no ambiguity about who the relevant reference actor is. In multi-person interactions, however,
the answer is less clear. Most of the  theories that are applicable in the '-person context assume
that players make comparisons with all other '%B players in the game. The only exemption is the
theory of Bolton and Ockenfels (BO). They assume that players compare themselves only with
the “average" player in the game and do not care about inequities between the other players. In
this regard the BO approach is inspired by the data of Selten and Ockenfels (1998) and Güth and
van Damme (1998), which seem to suggest that actors do not care for inequities among the other
reference agents. It would greatly simplify matters if this aspect of the BO theory were correct.
One problem with this aspect of the BO approach is that it renders the theory unable to
explain the punishment pattern in the public good game with punishment. Remember that in this
experiment the assignment of one punishment point reduces the income of the punished member
by 3 points. The theory of BO predicts that punishing subjects are indifferent between punishing
a free-rider and punishing a cooperator. All that matters is whether punishment brings the income
of the punishing subject closer to the average income in the group and for this purpose the
                                                
22 This section rests to a large extent on joint work of one of the authors with Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher (Falk,
Fehr, Fischbacher 2000a and 2000b, henceforth FFF). In particular, the organization of this section according to the
questions below and many of the empirical results emerged from this joint project.
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punishment of a cooperator is equally good as the punishment of a defector. Yet, in contrast to
this indifference prediction the cooperators predominantly punish the defectors.
To further test the BO-model, Fehr and Fischbacher (2000) conducted the following
Third-Party Punishment Game. There are three players, A, B, and C. Player A is endowed with
100 experimental currency units and must decide how much of the 100 units to give to B who has
no endowment. Player B is just a dummy player and has no decision power. Player C has an
endowment of 50 units and can spend this money on the punishment of A after he observes how
much A gave to B. For any money unit player C spends on punishment the payoff of player A is
reduced by 3 units.23 Note that without punishment player C is certain to get her fair share of the
total surplus (50 out of 150 units). Therefore, BO predict that C will never punish. In contrast to
this prediction players A are, however, punished a lot. The less player A gives to B the more C
punishes A. For example, if A gives nothing his income is reduced by roughly 30 percent. This
indicates that many players do care about inequities among other players. Further support for this
hypothesis comes from Charness and Rabin (2000) who offered player C the choice between the
payoff allocations (575,575,575) and (900,300,600). Because both allocations give player C the
fair share of 1/3 of the surplus, BO predict that player C will choose the second allocation which
gives him a higher absolute payoff. However, 54 percent of the subjects preferred the first
allocation. Note that the self-interest hypothesis also predicts the second allocation, so one cannot
conclude that the other 46 percent of the subjects have BO-preferences. A recent paper by Zizzo
and Oswald (2000) also strongly suggests that subjects care about the inequities among the set of
references agents.
It is important to note that theories in which fair-minded subjects have multiple reference
agents do not necessarily imply that fair subjects take actions in favor of /## other reference
agents. To illustrate this, consider the following three-person UG (Güth and van Damme 1998).
In this game there is a Proposer, a Responder who can reject or accept the proposal and a passive
Receiver who can do nothing but collect the amount of money allocated to him. The Proposer
proposes an allocation (x1,x2,x3) where x1 is the Proposer’s payoff, x2 the Responder’s payoff and
x3 the Receiver’s payoff. If the Responder rejects, all three players get nothing, otherwise the
proposed allocation is implemented.
It turns out that in this game the Proposers allocate substantial fractions of the surplus to
the Responder but little or nothing to the Receiver. Moreover, Güth and van Damme (p. 230)
                                                
23 In the experimental instructions the value laden term „punishment“ was not used. The punishment option of player
C was described in neutral terms by telling subjects that player C could “assign points” to player A that reduced the
incomes of A and C in the way described above.
27
report that “there is not a single rejection that can clearly be attributed to a low share for the
dummy (i.e., the Receiver, FS)”. BO take this as evidence in favor of their approach because the
Proposer and the Responder apparently do not take the Receiver’s interest into account. However,
this conclusion is premature because it is easy to show that approaches with multiple reference
agents are fully consistent with the Güth and van Damme data. The point can be demonstrated in
the context of the Fehr-Schmidt model. Assume for simplicity that the Proposer makes an offer of
x1=x2=x while the Receiver gets x3<x. It is easy to show that a Responder with FS-preferences
will never (!) reject such an allocation even if 0  = 0 and even if he is very fair-minded, i.e., has a
high β-coefficient. To see this note that the utility of the Responder if he accepts is given by H *7
0*8*9βNC:90*8*0 : which is positive for all β ≤ 1, and thus higher than the rejection payoff of zero.
A similar calculation shows that it takes implausibly high β-values to induce a Proposer to take
the interests of the Receiver into account.24
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Many models of fairness are based on the definition of a fair or equitable outcome to which
people compare the available payoff allocations. In experimental games a natural first
approximation for the relevant reference outcome is the equality of material payoffs. The quasi-
maximin theory of Charness and Rabin assumes instead that subjects care for the total surplus
accruing to the group. A natural way to study whether there are subjects who want to maximize
the total surplus is to construct experiments in which the predictions of both theories of inequality
aversion (BO and FS) are in conflict with surplus maximization. This has been done by Andreoni
and Miller (2000), Bolle and Kritikos (1998), Andreoni and Vesterlund (forthcoming), Charness
and Rabin (2000), Cox (2000) and Güth, Kliemt and Ockenfels (2000). Except for the Güth et al.
paper, these papers indicate that in DG-situations a non-negligible fraction of the subjects is
willing to give up some of their own money in order to increase total surplus, even if this implies
that they generate inequality that is to their disadvantage. Andreoni and Miller and Andreoni and
Vesterlund, for example, conducted DGs with varying prices for transferring money to the
Receiver. In some conditions the Allocator had to give up less than a Dollar to give the Receiver
a Dollar, in some conditions the exchange ratio was 1:1, and in some other conditions the
Allocator had to give up more than one Dollar. In the usual DGs the exchange ratio is 1:1 and
                                                
24 The Proposers utility is given by H *7*0 *8*9βNC:[90 *8*0 :*?*90 *8*0 :]; If we normalize the surplus to one and take
into account that 0 *?*0 *?*0 *7*B, H *7*9βNC:*?*9=NC:0 [9CN=:*%*β]; Thus, the marginal utility of x1 is positive unless β
exceeds CN=. This means that Proposers with β*O*CN= will give the Responders just enough to prevent rejection and,
since the Responders neglect the interests of the Receivers, nothing to the Receivers.
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there are virtually no cases in which an Allocator transfers more than 50 percent of the surplus. In
contrast, in DGs with an exchange ratio of 1:3 (or 1:2) a non-negligible number of subjects makes
transfers such that they end up with less money than the Receiver. This contradicts BO, FS, and
Falk and Fischbacher because in these models fair subjects never take actions that give the other
party more than they get. It is, however, consistent with altruistic preferences or quasi-maximin
preferences.
What is the relative importance of this kind of behavior? Andreoni and Vesterlund are
able to classify subjects in three distinct classes. They report that 44 % of their subjects (N= 141)
are completely selfish, 35 percent exhibit egalitarian preferences, i.e. they tend to equalize
payoffs, and 21 percent of the subjects can be classified as surplus maximizers. Charness and
Rabin report similar results with regard to the fraction of egalitarian subjects in a simple DG
where the Allocator had to choose between (own, other)-allocations of (400, 400) and (400, 750).
31 percent of the subjects preferred the egalitarian and 69 percent the surplus maximizing
allocation. Among the 69 percent there may, however, also be many selfish subjects who no
longer choose the surplus-maximizing allocation when this decreases their payoff only slightly.
This is suggested by the DG where the Allocator had to choose between (400, 400) and (375,
750). Here only 49 percent of surplus-maximizing choices were observed. Charness and Rabin
also present questionnaire evidence indicating that when the income disparities are greater the
egalitarian motive gains weight at the cost of the surplus maximization motive. When the
Allocator faces a choice between (400, 400) and (400, 2000),  62 percent prefer the egalitarian
allocation.
The evidence cited in the papers mentioned above indicates that surplus maximization is a
relevant motive &'*YZ!. This motive has not been included in the prevailing models of inequity
aversion but it would be straightforward to do this. It should also be remembered that /',
positive transfer in DGs is incompatible with intention based reciprocity models, &))"!-"1(&3"*.$
(+"* "01+/'>"* )/(". We would like to stress, however, that the DG is different from many
economically important games and real life situations, because in economic interactions it is
rarely the case that one player is at the complete mercy of another player. It may well be that in
situations, where V.(+ players have some power to affect the outcome, the surplus maximization
motive is less important than in DGs. The gift-exchange experiments by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and
Riedl (1993, 1998) are telling in this regard because they embed a situation that is like a DG into
an environment with competitive and strategic elements.
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These experiments exhibit a competitive element because the GEG is embedded into a
competitive experimental market. The experiments also exhibit a strategic element because the
Proposers are wage setters and have to take into account the likely effort responses of the
Responders. Yet, once the Responder has accepted a wage offer, the experiments are similar to a
DG because, for a given wage, the Responder essentially determines the income distribution and
the total surplus by his choice of the effort level. The gift exchange experiments are an ideal
environment to check the robustness of the surplus maximization motive because an increase in
the effort cost by one unit increases, on average, the total surplus by five units. Therefore, the
maximal feasible effort level is, in general, also the surplus maximizing effort level. If surplus
maximization is a robust motive capable of overturning inequity aversion, one would expect that
many Responders choose effort levels that give the Proposer a higher monetary payoff than the
Responder.25 Moreover, surplus maximization also means that we should '.( observe a positive
correlation between effort and wages because, for a given wage, the maximum feasible effort
always maximizes the total surplus.26
However, neither of these implications is supported by the data. Effort levels that give the
Proposer a higher payoff than the Responder are virtually non-existent. In the overwhelming
majority of the cases effort is substantially below the maximally feasible level and in less than
two percent of the cases the Proposer earns a higher payoff than the Responder.27 Moreover,
almost all subjects who regularly chose non-minimal effort levels exhibited a reciprocal effort-
wage relation. These numbers are in sharp contrast to the 49 percent of the Allocators in Charness
and Rabin who preferred the (375, 750) allocation over the (400, 400) allocation. One reason for
the difference across studies is perhaps the fact that it was much cheaper to increase the surplus in
the Charness-Rabin example. While the surplus increases in the gift exchange experiments on
average by five units, if the Responder sacrifices one payoff unit, the surplus increases by 14
units per payoff unit sacrificed in the Charness-Rabin case. This suggests that surplus
maximization gives rise to a violation of the equality constraint only if surplus increases are
extremely cheap. A second reason for the behavioral difference may be that, when both players
have some power to affect the outcome, the motive to increase the surplus is quickly crowded out
                                                
25 The Responders‘ effort level may, of course, also be affected by the intentions of the Proposer. For example,
paying a high wage may signal fair intentions which may increase the effort level. Yet, since this tends to raise effort
levels, we would have even stronger evidence against the surplus-maximization hypothesis, if we observe little or no
effort choices that give the Proposer a higher payoff than the Responder.
26 There are degenerate cases in which this is not true.
27 The total number of effort choices is N = 480 in these experiments, i.e., the results are not an artefact of a low
number of observations.
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by other considerations. This reason is quite plausible insofar as the outcomes in DGs themselves
are notoriously non-robust.
While the experimental results on UGs, GEGs or PGGs are fairly robust, the DG seems to
be a rather fragile situation in which minor factors can have large effects. Cox (2000), e. g.,
reports, that in his DGs BKK* -")1"'( of all subjects transferred positive amounts.28 This result
contrasts sharply with many other games, including the games in Charness and Rabin and many
other DGs. To indicate the other extreme, Eichenberger and Oberholzer (1998), Hoffman,
McCabe, Shachat and Smith (1994) and List and Cherry (2000) report on DGs with extremely
low transfers.29 Likewise, in the Impunity Game of Bolton and Zwick (1995), which is very close
but not identical to a DG, the vast majority of Proposers did not shy away from making very
unfair offers. The Impunity Game differs from the DG only insofar as the Responder can reject
an offer; however, the rejection destroys only the Responder’s but not the Proposer’s payoff. The
notorious non-robustness of outcomes in situations resembling the DG indicates that one should
be very careful in generalizing the results found in these situations to other games. Testing
theories of social preferences in DGs is a bit like testing the law of gravity with a table tennis
ball. In both situations minor unobserved distortions can have large effects. Therefore, we believe
that it is necessary to show that the same motivational forces that are inferred from DGs are also
behaviorally relevant in economically more important games. One way to do this is to apply the
theories that have been constructed on the basis of DG-experiments to predict outcomes in other
games. With the exemption of Andreoni and Miller (2000) this has not yet been done.
Andreoni and Miller (2000) estimate utility functions based on the results of their DG-
experiments and use them to predict co-operation behavior in a standard PGG. They predict
behavior in period one of these games, where co-operation is often quite high, rather well.
However, their predictions are far away from final period outcomes, where co-operation is
typically very low. In our view the low co-operation rates in the final period of repeated public
good games constitutes a strong challenge for models that rely exclusively on altruistic or
surplus-maximizing preferences. Why should a subject with a stable preference for the payoff of
others or the payoff of the whole group contribute much less in the final period compared to the
first period? Models of inequity aversion and intention-based or type-based reciprocity models
                                                
28 In Cox’s experiment both players had an endowment of 10 and the Allocator could transfer his endowment to the
Receiver where the transferred amount was trippled by the experimenter.
29 In Eichenberger and Oberholzer (1998) almost 90 percent of the subjects gave nothing. In Hoffman et al. (1992)
64 percent gave nothing and 19 percent gave between 1 and 10 percent. In List and Cherry subjects earned their
endowment in a quiz. Then they played the DG. Roughly 90 percent of the Allocators transferred nothing to the
Receivers.
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provide a plausible explanation for this behavior. All of these models predict that fair subjects
make their co-operation contingent on the co-operation of others. Thus, if the fair subjects realize
that there are sufficiently many selfish decisions in the course of a PGG experiment, they cease to
cooperate as well.
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Subjects with altruistic and quasi-maximin preferences do not take actions that reduce other
subjects’ payoffs. Yet, this is frequently observed in many important games. Models of inequity
aversion account for this by assuming that the payoff reduction is motivated by a desire to reduce
disadvantageous inequality. In intention-based reciprocity models and in Levine (1998) subjects
punish if they observe an action that is perceived to be unfair or that reveals that the opponent is
spiteful. In these models players want to reduce the opponent’s payoff irrespective of whether
they are better or worse off than the opponent and irrespective of whether they can change
income shares or income differences. Furthermore, intention-based theories predict that in games
in which no intention can be expressed there will be no punishment. Therefore, a clean way to
test for the relevance of intentions is to conduct control treatments in which choices are made
through a random device or through some neutral and disinterested third party.
Blount (1995) was the first who applied this idea to the UG. Blount compared the
rejection rate in the usual UG to the rejection rates in UGs in which either a computer generated a
random offer or a third party made the offer. Because in the random offer condition and the third
party condition a low offer cannot be attributed to the greedy intentions of the Proposer,
intention-based theories predict a rejection rate of zero in these conditions, while theories of
inequity aversion still allow for positive rejection rates. Levine’s theory is also consistent with
positive rejection rates in these conditions, but his theory predicts a decrease in the rejection rate
relative to the usual condition, because low offers made by humans reveal that the type who made
the offer is spiteful which can trigger a spiteful response. Blount indeed observes a significant
and substantial reduction in the acceptance thresholds of the Responders in the random offer
condition but not in the third party condition. Thus, the result of the random offer condition is
consistent with intention- and type based models while the result of the third party condition is
inconsistent with the motives captured by these models. Yet, these puzzling results may be due to
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some problematic features in Bount’s experiments.30 Subsequently, Offermann (1999) and FFF
(2000b) conducted further experiments with computerized offers but without the other worrisome
features in Blount. In particular, in these experiments the Responders knew that a rejection
affects the payoff of a real, human “Proposer”. Offerman finds that subjects are 67 percent more
likely to reduce the opponent’s payoff when the opponent made an intentional hurtful choice
compared to a situation where a computer made the hurtful choice.
FFF (2000b) conducted an experiment, invented by Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner
(2000), that simultaneously allows for the examination of positive and negative reciprocity. In
this game player A can give player B any integer amount of money >*∈ [0, 6] or, alternatively,
she can take away from B any integer amount of money ( ∈ [1, 6]. In case of >* R* K the
experimenter triples > so that B receives =>. If player A takes away (6 player A gets (*and player B
loses (; After player B observes >*or (6 she can pay A an integer reward )*∈ [0, 18] or she can
reduce A’s income by making an investment*& ∈ [1, 6]. A reward transfers one money unit from
B to A. An investment &*costs B exactly &*but reduces A’s income by =&. This game was played in
a random choice condition and in a human choice condition. It turns out that when the choices are
made by a human player A players B invest significantly more into payoff reductions for all ( ∈
[1, 6]. However, as in Blount and Offerman payoff reductions also occur when the computer
makes a hurtful choice.
Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996) provide further support that intentions play a role for
payoff-reducing behavior. In their experiments subjects bargained over 100 chips in an UG. They
conducted several treatments that varied the money value of the chips and the information
provided about the money value. For example, in one treatment the Proposers received three
times more money per chip than the Responders, i.e., the equal money split requires that the
Responders receive 75 chips. If the Responders know that the Proposers know the different
money values of the chips they reject unequal money splits much more frequently than if the
Responders know that the Proposers do '.( know the different money values of the chips. Thus,
knowingly unequal proposals were rejected at higher rates than unintentional unequal proposals.
Another way to test for the relevance of intention-based or type-based punishments is to
examine situations in which the subjects cannot increase their relative share or decrease payoff
                                                
30 Blount’s results may be affected by the fact that subjects (in two of three treatments) had to make decisions as a
Proposer /'4 as a responder before they knew their actual roles. After subjects had made their decisions in both
roles, the role for which they received payments was determined randomly. In one of Blount's treatments deception
was involved. Subjects believed that there were Proposers although in fact the experimenters made the proposals. All
subjects in this condition were "randomly" assigned to the responder role. In this treatment subjects also were not
paid according to their decisions but they received a flat fee instead.
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differences. FFF (2000a) report the results of UGs and PGGs with punishment that have this
feature. In the first (standard) treatment of the UG the Proposers could propose a (5,5)-or an
(8,2)-split of the surplus (the first number represents the Proposer’s payoff). In case of a rejection
both players received zero. In the second treatment the Proposers had the same options but a
rejection now meant that the payoff was reduced for both players by 2 units. The BO- as well as
the FS-model predict, therefore, that there will be no rejections in the second treatment while
intention-based and type-based models predict that punishments will occur. It turns out that the
rejection rate of the (8,2)-offer is 56 percent in the first and 19 percent in the second treatment.
Thus, roughly one third (19/57) of the rejections are consistent with a pure taste for punishment
as conceptualized in intention- and type-based models.31
FFF (2000a) also report the results of PGGs with punishment in which the punishing
subjects could not change the payoff difference between themselves and the punished subject. In
one of their treatments subjects had to pay one money unit in order to reduce the payoff of
another group member by one unit. Thus, BO and FS both predict that there will be no
punishment at all in this condition. In a second treatment investing one unit into punishment
reduced the payoff of the punished group member by three units.
FFF report that 51 percent of all subjects (N = 93) cooperate which is still compatible with
both BO and FS. However, another 51 percent of all cooperators punish the defectors. They
invest on average 4.8 money units into punishment. Thus, 25 percent of the subjects punish free-
riding which is incompatible with BO and FS. To evaluate the relative importance of this amount
of punishment we have to compare these results with the results of the second condition. In the
second condition 61 percent of all subjects (N = 120) cooperate and 59 percent of them punish
the defectors (by imposing a punishment of 5.7 on average). Thus, the overall percentage of
subjects who punish the defectors in the second condition is 36 percent. This suggests that a
rather large fraction (i.e., 25/36) of the overall amount of punishment is not consistent with BO
and FS.
Taken together the evidence from Blount (1995), Offerman (1999) and FFF (2000b)
indicates that the motive to punish unfair intentions or unfair types plays an important role.
Although the evidence provided by the initial study of Blount was mixed, the subsequent studies
indicate a clear role of these motives. However, the evidence also suggests that inequity aversion
plays an additional, non-negligible role. The evidence from the experiments in FFF (2000a)
                                                
31 Ahlert, Crüger and Güth (1999) also report a significant amount of punishment in UGs where the Responders
cannot change the payoff difference. However, since they do not have a control treatment it is not possible to say
something about the relative importance of this kind of punishment.
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suggests that many subjects who reduce the payoff of other players do not have the desire to
change the equitability of the payoff allocation. Instead, a large fraction of these subjects seems
to be driven by the desire to punish, i.e., a desire to hurt the other player. It is worthwhile to point
out that this desire to hurt the other players, while consistent with intention- and type based
models of reciprocity, does not necessarily constitute evidence in favor of these models. The
reason is that the desire to reduce the payoff of other players may also be triggered by an unfair
payoff allocation per se. 32
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Do intention- and type-based theories of fairness equally well in the domain of rewarding
behavior? It turns out that the evidence in this domain is much more mixed. Some experimental
results suggest that rewarding behavior is almost unaffected by these motives. Other results
indicate some minor role and only one paper finds an unambiguous positive effect of intention- or
type-based reciprocity.
Intention-based theories predict that people are generous only if they have been treated
kindly, i.e., if the first-mover has signaled a fair intention. Levine’s theory is similar in this regard
because generous actions are more likely if the first mover reveals that she is an altruistic type.
However, in contrast to the intention-based approaches Levine’s approach is also compatible with
unconditional giving &$*&(*&!*!2$$&1&"'(#,*!2)-#2!%"'+/'1&'>.
Neither intention- nor type-based reciprocity can explain positive transfers in the DG.
Moreover, Charness (1996), Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998), Offerman (1999), Cox (2000)
and Charness and Rabin (2000) provide further evidence that intentions do not play a big role for
rewarding behavior. Charness (1996) conducted GEGs in a random choice condition and a
human choice condition. Intention-based theories predict that in the random choice condition the
Responders will not put forward more than the minimal effort level irrespective of the wage level
because high wage offers are due to chance and not to kind intentions. In the human choice
condition higher wages indicate a higher degree of kindness and, therefore, a positive correlation
between wages and effort is predicted. Levine’s theory allows, in principle, for a positive
                                                
32 Assume that fair subjects have the following utility function: 2  = 0  + α [1/('-1)][Σj ≠ i β90 * %* 0 :3(0 )], where α
measures the strength of player &’s non-pecuniary preference, and 3(π ) is an increasing function of player G’s material
payoff. β90 *%*0 ) is positive if 0 *%*0  > 0 and negative if 0 *%*0  < 0. Thus, a state of inequality triggers the desire to
reduce or increase the other players’ payoff. In this regard the above utility function is similar to the preference
assumption in FS. Yet, in contrast to FS, the aim of player & is no longer the reduction of the payoff difference.
Instead, player & just wants to reduce or increase the other player’s payoff depending on the sign of β;
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correlation between wages and effort in both conditions, because an increase in effort benefits the
Proposer much more than they cost the Responder. However, the correlation should be much
stronger in the human choice condition due to the type-revealing effect of high wages. Charness
finds a significantly positive correlation in the random choice condition. In the human choice
condition effort is only slightly lower at low wages and equally high at high wages. This
indicates, if anything, only a minor role for intention and type-driven behavior. The best
interpretation is probably that inequity aversion or quasi-maximin preferences induce non-
minimal effort levels in this setting. In addition, negative reciprocity kicks in at low wages which
explains the lower effort levels in the human choice condition.
Cox (2000) tries to isolate rewarding responses in the context of a TG by using a related
DG as a control condition. In the TG Cox observes a baseline level of Responder transfers back
to the Proposer. To isolate the relevance of intention-driven responses he conducts a DG in which
the distribution of endowments is identical to the distribution of material payoffs after the
Proposers’ choices in the TG. Thus, both in the TG and in the DG the Responders face exactly
the same distributions of material payoffs but in the TG this distribution has been caused
intentionally by the Proposers while in the DG the distribution is predetermined by the
experimenter. In Cox’ DG the motive of rewarding kindness can, therefore, play no role and
intention-based theories as well as Levine’s theory predict that Responders transfer nothing back.
If one takes into account that some transfers in the DG are driven by inequity aversion or quasi-
maximin preferences, the difference between the transfers in the DG and the transfers in the TG
measure the relevance of intention- or type-based theories. Cox’ results indicate that these
theories play only a minor or no role in this context. In one condition there is no difference in
transfers between the TG and the DG and in another condition transfers in the DG are lower by
only one third.
The strongest evidence against the role of intentions comes from Bolton, Brandts and
Ockenfels (1998). They conducted sequential social dilemma experiments that are akin to a
sequentially played Prisonners’ Dilemma. In one condition the first movers could make a kind
choice relative to a baseline choice. The kind choice implied that – for any choice of the second
mover- the payoff of the second mover increased by 400 units at a cost of 100 for the first mover.
Then the second mover could take costly actions in order to reward the first mover. In a control
condition the first mover could only make the baseline choice, i.e. he could not express any kind
intentions. It turns out that second movers reward the first movers even more in this control
condition. Although this difference is not significant, the results clearly suggest that intention-
driven rewards play no role in this experiment.
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The strongest evidence in favor of intentions comes from the moonlighting game of FFF
(2000b) described in the previous subsection. FFF find that for /## positive transfers of player A,
players B send back significantly more money in the human choice condition. Moreover, the
difference between the rewards in the human choice condition and the random choice condition
are also quantitatively important. A recent paper by McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2000) also
reports evidence in favor of intention driven positive reciprocity. They show that after a nice
choice of the first-mover two thirds of the second movers make nice choices, too, while if the
first mover is forced to make the nice choice only one third of the second movers make the nice
choice.
In the absence of the evidence provided by FFF and McCabe et al. one would have to
conclude that the motive to reward good intentions or fair types is (at best) of minor importance.
However, in view of the relatively strong results in the final two papers it seems wise to be more
cautious and to wait for further evidence. Nevertheless, the bulk of the evidence suggests that
inequity aversion and efficiency seeking are more important than intention- or type-based
reciprocity in the domain of kind behavior.
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Although most fairness models discussed in Section 3 are just a few years old the discussion in
this section shows that there is already a fair amount of evidence that sheds light on the relative
performance of the different models. This indicates a quick and healthy interaction between
experimental research and the development of new theories. The initial experimental results
discussed in Section 2 gave rise to a number of new theories which, in turn, have again been
quickly subjected to careful and rigorous empirical testing. Although these tests have not yet led
to conclusive results regarding the relative importance of the different motives many important
and interesting insights have been obtained. In our view the main results can be summarized as
follows:
1) Evidence from the Third Party Punishment Game and the PGG with punishment indicates
that many subjects do compare themselves with other people in the group and not just to the
group as a whole or to the group average.
2) There is a non-negligible number of subjects in DGs whose behavior is consistent with
surplus maximization. However, the relative quantitative importance of this motive in
economically relevant settings has yet to be determined and surplus maximization alone
cannot account for many robust regularities in other games.
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3) Pure revenge as captured by reciprocity models is an important motive for payoff-reducing
behavior. In some games like the PGG with punishment it seems to be the dominant source of
payoff-reducing behavior. Since pure equity models do not capture this motive they cannot
explain a significant amount of payoff-reducing behavior.
4) In the domain of kind behavior the motives captured by intention- or type-based models of
fairness seem to be less important than in the domain of payoff-reducing behavior. Several
studies indicate that inequity aversion or quasi-maximin preferences play a more important
role here.
Which model of fairness does best in the light of the data and which one should be used in
applications to economically important phenomena? We believe that it is too early to give a
conclusive answer to these questions. There is a large amount of heterogeneity at the individual
level and any model of fairness has difficulties in explaining the full diversity of the experimental
observations. The evidence suggests, however, some tentative answers to these questions. In our
view the most important heterogeneity is the one between purely selfish subjects and fair-minded
subjects. The success of the BO-model and the FS-model in explaining a large variety of data
from bargaining, co-operation and market games is partly due to this recognition. Within the
class of these equity models the evidence suggests that the FS-model does better. In particular,
the experiments discussed in Section 4.1 indicate that people do not compare themselves with the
group as a whole but rather with other individuals in the group. The group average is less
compelling as a yardstick to measure equity than differences in individual payoffs.
However, the FS-model clearly does not recognize the full heterogeneity within the class
of fair-minded individuals. Section 4.4 makes it clear that an important part of payoff-reducing
behavior is not driven by the desire to reduce payoff-differences but by the desire to reduce the
payoff of those who take unfair actions or reveal themselves as unfair types. The model therefore
underestimates the amount of punishing behavior in situations where the cost of punishment is
relatively high compared to the payoff-reductions that can be achieved by punishing. Fairness
models that are exclusively based on intentions (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1998)
can, in principle, account for this type of punishment. Yet, these models have other undesirable
features - including multiple, and very counterintuitive, equilibria in many games and a very high
degree of complexity that is due to the use of psychological game theory. The same has to be said
about the intention-based theory of Charness and Rabin (2000). Falk and Fischbacher (1999) is
not plagued by the multiple equilibrium problem as much as the pure intention models. This is
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due to the fact that they incorporate equity as a global reference standard. Their model shares
however, the complexity costs of psychological game theory.
Even though none of the available theories can take into account the full complexity of
motives at the individual level, some theories may allow for better approximations than others.
The evidence presented in Section 2 shows clearly that there are many important economic
problems for which the self-interest theory is unambiguously, and in a quantitatively important
way, refuted. The recent papers by BO and FS show that one can account for the bulk of this
evidence by models that explicitly take into account that there are selfish and fair-minded
individuals. Although we believe that it is desirable to tackle the heterogeneity within the class of
fair-minded subjects in parsimonious and tractable models, we also believe that the heterogeneity
between selfish and fair types is more important. In fact, in the following section we will show
that the FS-model provides surprisingly good qualitative and quantitative predictions in important
economic domains. Thus, even if we do net yet have a fully satisfactory model of fair behavior,
one can probably go a long way with simple models that take into account the interaction
between selfish and fair types.
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The self-interest model fails to explain the experimental evidence in many games in which only a
few players interact, but it is very successful in explaining the outcome of competitive markets. It
is a well-established experimental fact that in a broad class of market games prices converge to
the competitive equilibrium.33 This result holds even if the resulting allocation is very unfair by
any notion of fairness. Thus, the question arises: If so many people resist unfair outcomes in, say,
the ultimatum game, why don’t they behave the same way when there is competition among the
players?
To answer this question consider the following ultimatum game with Proposer
competition, that was conducted by Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991) in four
different countries. There are '%B Proposers who simultaneously offer a share !∈LK6BM, &*∈*AB6*;;;6
'%BE, to one Responder. The Responder can either accept or reject the highest offer ! 7*@/0
A! E. If there are several Proposers who offered ! , one of them is selected at random with equal
probability. If the Responder accepts ! , her monetary payoff is !  and the successful Proposer
                                                
33 See e.g. Smith (1962) and Davis and Holt (1993).
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earns B%* ! , while all the other Proposers get K. If the Responder rejects, everybody gets a
payoff of K.
The prediction of the self-interest model is straightforward: All Proposers will offer !7B
which is accepted by the Responder. Hence, all Proposers get a payoff of zero and the
monopolistic Responder captures the entire surplus. This outcome is clearly very unfair, but it
describes precisely what happened in the experiments. After a few periods of adaptation !  was
very close to B and all the surplus was captured by the Responder.34
This result is remarkable. It does not seem to be more fair that one side of the market gets
all of the surplus in this setting than in the standard ultimatum game. Why do the Proposers let
the Responder get away with it? The reason is that in this strategic setting preferences for fairness
or reciprocity cannot have any effect. To see this, suppose that each of the Proposers strongly
dislikes to get less than the Responder. Consider Proposer & and let !P7*@/0 ≠ *A*! *E*be the highest
offer made by his fellow Proposers. If Proposer & offers ! O !P, then his offer has no effect and he
will get a monetary payoff of K with certainty. Furthermore, he cannot prevent that the Responder
gets !P and that one of the other Proposers gets B%!P, so he will suffer from getting less than these
two. However, if he offers a little bit more than !P, say !P?ε, then he will win the competition, get
a positive monetary payoff, and reduce the inequality between himself and the Responder. Hence,
he should try to overbid his competitors. This process drives the share that is offered by the
Proposers up to 1. There is nothing the Proposers can do about it even if all of them have a strong
preference for fairness. We prove this result formally in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for the case of
inequity averse players, but the same result is also predicted by the approaches of Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) and Levine (1998).
Does this mean that sufficiently strong competition will always wipe out the impact of
fairness? The answer to this question is negative because fairness matters much more in market
games in which the execution of contracts cannot be completely determined at the stage where
the parties conclude the contracts. Labor markets are a good example. A labor contracts is highly
incomplete, because it cannot enforce the level of effort provided by the employee who chooses
his effort level after the contract has been signed. These contractual features are captured by the
Gift Exchange Game (GEG) in an experimental setting.
                                                
34 The experiments were conducted in Israel, Japan, Slovenia and the U.S. In all experiments there were 9 Proposers
and 1 responder. Roth et.al. also conducted the standard ultimatum game with one Proposer in these four countries.
They did find some small (but statistically signifant) differences between countries in the standard ultimatum game
which may be attributed to cultural differences. However, there are no statistically significant differences between
countries for the ultimatum game with Proposer competition.
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When the GEG is embedded into a competitive experimental market, as e.g. in Fehr,
Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1998, 1998), wages turn out to be systematically higher than the
competitive equilibrium wage predicted by the self-interest model. There is also no tendency for
wages to decrease over time. The reason for this stable wage premium is the effort behavior of
the Responders: On average, effort levels are increasing with wages which provides an incentive
for the firms to pay a wage premium. If, however, the effort level is fixed exogenously by the
experimenter, the firms do not shy away from pushing down wages to the competitive level. FS
and BO can explain this pattern in a straightforward manner. When effort is endogenous, inequity
averse Responders respond to high wages with high effort levels in order to prevent an unequal
distribution of the surplus from trade. This induces all firms (including purely selfish ones) to pay
a wage premium because it is profitable to do so. When effort is exogenous this mechanism does
not work and competition drives down wages to the competitive level.
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If fairness concerns affect the behavior of economic agents in so many situations, then it
should also be taken into account in the design of incentive schemes. Surprisingly, hardly any
theoretical and very little empirical or experimental work has been done to study the impact of
fairness on incentive provision. Standard contract theory neglects this issue and assumes that all
agents are only interested in their own material payoffs. Over the past two decades this theory has
been highly successful in solving fairly complicated contractual problems and in designing very
sophisticated mechanisms and incentive schemes. This gave rise to many important and
fascinating insights, and the methods developed there have been applied in almost all areas of
economics. However, standard contract theory still finds it difficult to explain the simplicity and
incompleteness of many contracts that we observe in the real world. In particular, it cannot
explain why the parties’ monetary payoffs are often not tied to measures of performance that
would be available at a relatively small cost. For example, the salary of a teacher or a university
professor is rarely contingent on students’ test scores, teaching ratings, or citations. These
performance measures are readily available and easily verifiable, so one has to conclude that
these contracts are deliberately left incomplete.35
                                                
35 The literature on incomplete contracts acknowledges contractual incompleteness, but most of this literature simply
assumes that no long-term contingent contracts are feasible and does not attempt to explain this premise. See, e.g.,
Grossman and Hart (1986) or Hart and Moore (1990) and Section 5.3 below. There is a small literature on
endogenous incomplete contracts. Some papers in this literature, e.g. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994), Nöldeke
and Schmidt (1995) or  Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), show that in some situations a properly designed incomplete
contract can implement the first best, so there is no need to write a more complete contract. Some other papers, e.g.
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In a recent paper, Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2000) take a fresh look at contractual
incompleteness by taking concerns for fairness and reciprocity into account. They report on
several simple principal-agent experiments in which the principal was given a choice whether to
offer a “complete” contract or a less complete one. In the first experimental design an agent had
to pick an effort level between 1 and 10 (at a monetary cost to herself) that is perfectly observed
by a principal and can be verified (at a small fixed cost) to the courts. The principal can try to
induce the agent to spend effort by imposing a fine on the agent that is enforced by the courts if
she works too little. However, the fine is bounded above so that the highest implementable effort
level ("[7\) falls short of the first best efficient action (" 7BK). In this contractual environment
principal agent theory predicts that the principal should use the maximal fine in order to induce
the agent to choose "[7\, and that he should offer a fixed wage that holds the agent down to her
reservation utility. If the agent complies with the contract, the principal can capture roughly 30
percent of the first best surplus for himself while the agent gets nothing.
There are two alternatives to this “incentive contract”. In one treatment the principal could
choose to offer a “trust contract” which does without a fine and simply pays a generous fixed
wage up front to the agent asking her to reciprocate by spending a higher level of effort.
However, effort cannot be enforced with this contract. In a second treatment the principal could
offer a “bonus contract”, which specifies a fixed wage, a desired level of effort, and an
announced bonus payment if the effort is to the principal’s satisfaction. However, both parties
know that the bonus cannot be enforced and is left at the discretion of the principal. The trust and
the bonus contract are clearly less complete than the incentive contract. Because the experiments
carefully rule out any repeated interactions between the parties, both types of contracts are,
according to standard principal agent theory, doomed to fail. Given the fixed wage, a pure self-
interested agent will not spend any effort.  Similarly, a principal who is only interested in his own
income will never pay a bonus, so a rational agent should never put in any effort.
If concerns for fairness and reciprocity are taken into account, the predictions are less
clear cut. Consider again the optimal incentive contract (as suggested by principal agent theory).
This contract aims at a rather unfair distribution of the surplus. If the agent is concerned about
this, there are two ways how she could punish the principal. First, as in an ultimatum game, she
could simply reject the contract in which case both parties get a payoff of zero. A second, and
more interesting, punishment strategy is to accept the contract and to shirk. Note that if the
                                                                                                                                                             
Che and Hausch (1998), Segal (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999) show that, although an incomplete contract does
not implement the first best, a more complete contract is of no value to the parties because it is impossible to get
closer to the efficiency frontier.
42
incentive compatibility constraint is just binding, then the cost of shirking to the agent is zero and
independent of the fixed wage offered by the principal. Thus, if the principal offers a somewhat
higher wage, that gives a positive (but still “unfair”) share of the surplus to the agent, the agent
can punish the principal by accepting the wage and shirking (at zero cost to herself). Hence,
concerns for fairness and reciprocity suggest that the principal has to offer a fairly generous wage
in order to get the agent to accept and to work, which makes the incentive contract less attractive.
On the other hand, concerns for fairness and reciprocity improve the performance of trust
and bonus contracts.  A fair agent will reciprocate to a generous wage offer in a trust contract by
putting in a higher effort level voluntarily. Similarly, a fair principal will reciprocate to a high
effort level by paying a generous bonus, making it worth the agent’s while to spend more effort.
Unfortunately, however, on such a general level it is impossible to make any clear cut predictions
about the relative performance of the three types of contracts. Is the incentive contract going to be
outperformed by the trust and/or the bonus contract? Induces the bonus contract a higher level of
effort than the trust contract or rather the other way round?
In order to obtain quantitative predictions for the experiments, Fehr, Klein and Schmidt
(2000) apply the model of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to this moral hazard
problem. Most other models of fairness or intention-based reciprocity would probably yield
similar results and we want to stress that these experiments were not designed to discriminate
between different notions of fairness. The main advantage of our model of inequity aversion is
just its simplicity, which makes it straightforward to apply to these games. However, Fehr, Klein
and Schmidt (2000) have to make a few additional assumptions. In particular, they assume for
simplicity that there are only two types of subjects, “selfish” players who are only interested in
their own material payoffs, and “fair” players who are willing to give up own resources in order
to achieve a more equal payoff distribution. Furthermore, in rough accordance with the
experimental results of many ultimatum and dictator games, they assume that 60 percent of the
population are selfish and 40 percent are fair.
With these assumptions it is a straightforward exercise to analyse the different types of
contracts and to obtain the following predictions:
1. ])2!(*^.'()/1(!_ Fair agents will reciprocate to high wage offers by putting in an effort level
that equalizes payoffs, while selfish agents will choose the minimum effort level of 1. Thus, a
higher wage offer will, on average, induce a higher level of effort. However, it can be shown
that if less than 2/3 of all agents are fair, paying a higher wage does not raise the principal’s
expected profit. Therefore, with 40 percent fair agents, the trust contract is not going to work.
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2. T'1"'(&3"* ^.'()/1(!_ For the same reason as in the trust contract it does not pay for the
principals to elicit higher average effort levels by paying generous wages. Thus, both selfish
and fair principals impose the highest possible fine to induce the agent to choose e = 4.
However, while the fair principals share the surplus arising from e = 4 equally with the agent,
selfish principals propose unfair contracts that give them the whole surplus. They anticipate
that the fair agents reject these contracts, but because the 60 percent selfish agents accept
these contracts, this strategy is still profitable.
3. `.'2!* ^.'()/1(!_ Selfish principals always pay a bonus of zero but fair principals pay a
bonus that divides the surplus equally between the principal and the agent. Therefore, the
bonus is on average increasing with the agent’s effort. Moreover, the relation between the
effort and the average bonus is sufficiently steep to induce a selfish agent to put it an effort
level of 7. However, the fair agent chooses an effort level of only 1 or 2 (depending on the
fixed wage). The reason for this surprising result is that the fair agent is not only concerned
about her expected monetary payoff, but that she suffers in addition from the inequality that
arises if a selfish principal does not pay the bonus. Nevertheless, on average, the bonus
contract implements a higher level of effort ("7Q;C) and yields a higher payoff for the
principal than both, the incentive contract and the trust contract.36
What are the experimental results? Each experiment had 10 periods, in each of which each
principal was matched randomly and anonymously with a different agent. In the first treatment,
where principals could choose between a trust and an incentive contract, roughly 50 percent of
the principals chose a trust contract and 50 percent chose an incentive contract in period 1.
However, the fraction of incentive contracts rose quickly and after period 5 roughly 80 percent of
all contractual choices were incentive contracts. Those principals who offered a trust contract
paid generous wages to which some agents reciprocated by putting in a high effort level.
However, in 64 percent of all trust contracts the agents chose "7B. Thus, on average, principals
incurred considerable losses when they proposed trust contracts. The incentive contracts did
better, but they did much less well than predicted by standard principal agent theory. They also
did less well than predicted by the model of inequity aversion. The reason is that at the beginning
many principals offered incentive contracts with fairly high wages that were not incentive
                                                
36 The analysis of the bonus contract is complicated by the fact that the principal has to move twice. He offers the
terms of the contract at the first stage of the game and he has to choose his bonus payment at the last stage. Thus, his
contract offer may reveal some information about his type. However, it can be shown that there is no separating
equilibrium in this game and that all pooling equilibria have the properties described above. Furthermore, if we
assume that a higher wage offer is not interpreted by the agent as a signal that she faces the selfish principal with a
higher probability, then there is a unique pooling equilibrium. See Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2000).
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compatible. In these cases 62 percent of the agents shirked imposing considerable losses on
principals. On the other hand, those principals who offered incentive compatible incentive
contracts with low wages did fairly well. Principals learnt to properly design incentive contracts
over time. The fraction of incentive compatible contracts increased from only 10 percent in
period 1 to 64 percent in period 10.
In the second treatment the principal had to choose between a bonus contract and an
incentive contract. From the very beginning the bonus contract was much more popular than the
incentive contract and accounted for roughly 90 percent of all contractual choices. Many
principals did not pay a bonus, but a significant fraction reciprocated generously to higher effort
levels. The average bonus was, therefore, strongly increasing in the effort level which made it
worthwhile for the agents to put forward rather high effort levels. The average effort level was
5.2, which is significantly higher than the average effort of 2.5 induced by incentive contracts.
The bonus contract is not only more efficient than the incentive contract, it also yields on average
a much higher payoff to the principal and a moderately higher payoff to the agent. These results
are clearly inconsistent with the self-interest model while the model of inequity aversion explains
them surprisingly well.37
Our experiments demonstrate that quite powerful incentives can be given by a very
incomplete bonus contract. The bonus contract relies on reciprocal fairness as an enforcement
device. It does better than the more complete incentive contracts V"1/2!" it is incomplete and
thus leaves more freedom to the parties to reciprocate. This enforcement mechanism is not
perfect and, depending on the payoff structure and the fraction of reciprocal types in the
population, it can fail. In fact, we have seen that the trust contract, in which the principal has to
pay the “bonus” unconditionally in advance, is not viable in the set up of our experiments. Yet,
the performance of the bonus contract suggests that the effect of reciprocal fairness, that has been
neglected in contract theory so far, is important for optimal contractual design and should be
taken into account.
                                                
37 In a second experimental design, Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2000) consider a multi-task principal agent model
inspired by Holmström and Milgrom (1991). In this experiment the agents have to choose two separate effort levels
(“tasks”), "  and " , both of which are observable by the principal but only "  is verifiable and can be contracted
upon. The principal can choose between a piece-rate contract that rewards the agent for his effort spent on task 1 and
a bonus contract that announces a voluntary bonus payment if the agent’s effort on both tasks is to the principal’s
satisfaction. The overwhelming majority of principals opted for the bonus contract which induced the agents to
spend, on average, a considerable amount of effort and to allocate total effort efficiently across tasks. Those
principals that chose a piece-rate contract, induced the agents to concentrate all of their total efforts on task 1, which
is very inefficient. Again, these results are inconsistent with the self-interest model, but they can be nicely explained
by the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion.
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Consider two parties, A and B, who are engaged in a joined project (a “firm”) to which they have
to make some relationship specific investments today in order to generate a joint surplus in the
future. An important question that has received considerable attention in recent years is who
should own the firm. In a seminal paper, Grossman and Hart (1986) argue that ownership rights
allocate residual rights of control on the physical assets that are required to generate the surplus.
For example, if A owns the firm, then he will have a stronger bargaining position than B in the
renegotiation game in which the surplus between the two parties is shared ex post, because he can
exclude B from using the assets which makes B’s relationship specific investment less
productive. Grossman and Hart show that there is no ownership structure that implements first
best investments, but some ownership structures do better than others and there is a unique
second best optimal allocation of ownership rights.
A common feature of most incomplete contract models is that joint ownership cannot be
optimal.38 This result is at odds with the fact that there are many jointly owned companies,
partnerships or joint ventures. Furthermore, the argument neglects that reciprocal fairness may be
an important enforcement mechanism to induce the involved parties to invest more under joint
ownership than otherwise predicted. In order to test this hypothesis, Fehr, Kremhelmer and
Schmidt (2000) conducted a series of experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights.
The experimental game is a grossly simplified version of Grossman and Hart (1986): There are
two parties, A and B, who have to make investments, /, V*∈*AB6*;;;6*BKE, respectively, in order to
generate a joint surplus 39/6V:; Investments are sequential: B has to invest first, his investment
level V is observed by A, who has to invest thereafter. We consider two possible ownership
structures: Under A-ownership, A hires B as an employee and pays her a fixed wage 5. In this
case monetary payoffs are 39/6V:%5%/ for A and 5%V for B. Under joint ownership, each party gets
half of the gross surplus minus his or her investment cost, i.e. K;Q39/6V:8/ for A and K;Q39/6V:%V
for B. The gross profit function has been chosen such that maximal investments are efficient, i.e.
                                                
38 To see this note that in the renegotiation game in which the surplus is shared each party gets its reservation utility
plus a fixed fraction (50 percent, say) of the joint surplus in excess of the sum of the reservation utilities. Now
consider A-ownership. If A invests, then his investment increases not only the joint surplus but also his reservation
utility (i.e., what he could get out of the firm without B’s collaboration). On the other hand, if B invests, then her
investment increases only the joint surplus, but it does not improve her reservation utility. The reason is that the
investment requires access to the firm in order to be productive. Hence, without the firm B’s investment is useless.
This is why A will invest more than B under A-ownership. Consider now joint ownership. If both parties own the
firm jointly, then each of them can prevent the other from using the assets. Hence neither A’s nor B’s investment
affects their respective reservation utilities. Therefore, A’s investment incentives are reduced while B’s investment
incentives do not improve. Hence, joint ownership is Inferior.
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/ 7V 7BK, but if each party gets only 50 percent of the marginal return of their investments,
then it is a dominant strategy for a purely self-interested player to choose the minimum level of
investment, /*7*V*7*B. Finally, in the first stage of the game, A can decide whether to be the sole
owner of the firm and make a wage offer to B, or whether to have joint ownership.
The prediction of the self-interest model is straightforward. Under A-ownership B has no
incentive to invest and will choose V7B. On the other hand, A is full residual claimant on the
margin, so she will invest efficiently. Under joint ownership each party gets only 50 percent of
the marginal return which is not sufficient to induce any investments. Hence in this case B’s
optimal investment level is unchanged, but A’s investment level is reduced to /7B. Thus, A-
ownership outperforms joint ownership and A should hire B as an employee.
In the experiments just the opposite happened. Party A chose joint ownership in more
than 80 percent (187 out of 230) of all observations and gave away 50 percent of the gross return
to B. Moreover, the fraction of joint ownership contracts increased from 74 percent in the first
two periods to 89 percent in the last two periods. With joint ownership B-players chose on
average an investment level of 8.9 and A responded with an investment of 6.5 (on average). On
the other hand, if A-ownership was chosen and A hired B as an employee, B’s average
investment was only 1.3, while all A-players chose an investment level of 10. Furthermore A-
players earned much more on average if they chose joint ownership rather than A-ownership.
These results are inconsistent with the self-interest model, but it is straightforward to
explain them with concerns for fairness. Applying the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequity
aversion gives again fairly accurate quantitative predictions. Thus, the experimental results and
the theoretical analysis suggest that joint ownership may do better than A-ownership because it
offers more scope for reciprocal behavior. Subjects seem to understand this and predominantly
choose this ownership structure.
I' 8)-0/12,)-2
The self-interest model has been very successful in explaining individual behavior on competitive
markets, but it is unambiguously refuted in many situations in which individuals interact
strategically. The experimental evidence on, e.g., ultimatum games, dictator games, gift exchange
games, and public good games, demonstrates unambiguously that many people are not only
maximizing their own material payoffs, but that they are also concerned about social
comparisons, fairness, and the desire to reciprocate.
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We have reviewed several models that try to take these concerns explicitly into account. A
general lesson to be drawn from these models is that the assumption that some people are fair-
minded and have the desire to reciprocate does not imply that these people will always behave
“fairly”. In some environments like, e.g. in competitive markets or in public good games without
punishment, fair-minded actors will often behave as if they are purely self-interested. Likewise, a
purely self-interested person may often behave as if he is strongly concerned about fairness like,
e.g., the Proposers who make fair proposals in the ultimatum game or generous wage offers in the
gift exchange game. Thus, the behavior of fair-minded and purely self-interested actors depends
on the strategic environment in which they interact and on their beliefs about the fairness of their
opponents. The analysis of this behavior is not trivial and it is helpful to develop theoretical tools
to better understand what we observe.
Some of the models reviewed above focus solely on preferences over income distributions
and ignore the fact that people often care about the intentions behind the actions of their
opponents. Some other papers focus only on intention-based or type-based reciprocity and ignore
the fact that some people are bothered by unfair distributions even if their opponent could not do
anything about it. It seems natural to try to combine these two motivations in a single model as
has been done by Falk and Fischbacher (1998) and Charness and Rabin (2000). However, we
believe that the cost of doing so is high. These models are rather complicated, they rely on
psychological game theory and it is difficult to apply them even to very simple experimental
games. Moreover, Charness and Rabin, in particular, is plagued with multiple equilibria and has
much more free parameters than all other models. On the other hand, simple models of social
preferences, like Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000) ERC-model or our own (1999) model of inequity
aversion, fit the data on large classes of games fairly well. They use standard game theory, they
have fewer parameters to be estimated, and it is fairly straightforward to get clear-cut qualitative
and quantitative predictions.
The main advantage of these simple models is that they can easily be applied to other
fields in economics. For more than 20 years experimental economists concentrated on simple
experimental games in order to better understand what drives economic behavior. However, very
few of the insights that have been gained had any impact on how economists interpret the world.
We feel that it is now time to change this. Many phenomena in situations in which people interact
strategically cannot be understood by relying on the self-interest model alone. Our examples from
contract theory and the theory of property rights illustrate that models of reciprocal fairness can
be fruitfully applied to important and interesting economic questions, yielding predictions that are
much closer to what we observe in many situations of the real world and in carefully controlled
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experiments than the predictions of the self-interest model. There are many other areas in which
fairness models are likely to generate interesting new insights - be it the functioning of labor
markets or questions of political economy, be it the design of optimal mechanisms or questions of
compliance with organizational rules and the law.
We hope that this is just the beginning. There is no shortage of important questions to
which the newly developed tools and insights can be applied.
49
N#(#"#-0#2
Abbink, K., Bernd Irlenbusch, and Elke Renner, (2000). “The Moonlighting Game. An
Experimental Study on Reciprocity and Retribution.” a.2)'/#*.$*b1.'.@&1*`"+/3&.)*/'4
c)>/'&</(&.'6*forthcoming.
Agell, Jonas and Per Lundborg, 1995. “Theories of Pay and Unemployment: Survey Evidence
from Swedish Manufacturing Firms”, d1/'4&'/3&/'*a.2)'/#*.$*b1.'.@&1! 97, 295-308.
Ahlert, Marlies, Arwed Crüger and Werner Güth, 1999. “An Experimental Analysis of Equal
Punishment Games”, mimeo, University of Halle-Wittenberg.
Alm, James, Isabel Sanchez and Ana de Juan, 1995. “Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax
Compliance”, e,X#.! 48, 3-18.
Andreoni, James 1989. “Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian
Equivalence.” a.2)'/#*.$*f.#&(&1/#*b1.'.@, 97, 1447-1458.
Andreoni, James, Brian Erard and Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. “Tax Compliance”, a.2)'/#* .$
b1.'.@&1*g&(")/(2)" 36, 818-860.
Andreoni, James and Miller, John, 1993. “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence”, b1.'.@&1*a.2)'/# 103, 570-585.
Andreoni, James and Miller, John, 2000. “Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of
the Rationality of Altruism.” h&@"., University of Wisconsin and Carnegie Mellon
University.
Andreoni, James and Lise Vesterlund, forthcoming. “Which is the fair Sex? Gender Differences
in Altruism”, i2/)(")#,*a.2)'/#*.$*b1.'.@&1!.
Andreoni, James and Hal Varian, 1999. “Preplay Contracting in the Prisonners’ Dilemma”,
f).1""4&'>!*.$*(+"*D/(&.'/#*S1/4"@,*.$*d1&"'1"! 96, 10933-10938.
Aghion, Philippe, Dewatripont, Matthias and Rey, Philippe, 1994. “Renegotiation Design with
Unverifiable Information.” b1.'.@"()&1/ 62, 257-282.
Arrow, Kenneth J., 1981. “Optimal and Voluntary Income Redistribution.” In: Rosenfield, Steven
(ed),  b1.'.@&1* J"#$/)"* /'4* (+"* b1.'.@&1!* .$* d.3&"(* d.1&/#&!@_* b!!/,!* &'* j.'.)* .$
SV)/@*`")>!.', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Becker, Gary S., 1974. “A Theory of Social Interactions.” a.2)'/#* .$* f.#&(&1/#* b1.'.@, 82,
1063-1093.
Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity and Social History,"
Z/@"!*/'4*b1.'.@&1*`"+/3&.) X, 122-142.
50
Bernheim, B. Douglas, 1986. “On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods.”
S@")&1/'*b1.'.@&1*U"3&"5 76, 789-793.
Bewley, Truman, 1999. J+,*J/>"!* 4.'P(* $/##* 42)&'>* /* U"1"!!&.', Harvard University Press,
Harvard.
Binmore, Kenneth, John Gale and Larry Samuelson, 1995. “Learning to be Imperfect: The
Ultimatum Game”, Z/@"!*/'4*b1.'.@&1*`"+/3&.) 8, 56-90.
Binmore, Ken, 1998. Z/@"* ]+".),* /'4* (+"* d.1&/#* ^.'()/1(_* a2!(* f#/,&'>, MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Blount, Sally, 1995. "When Social Outcomes aren’t Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on
Preferences," c)>/'&</(&.'/#*`"+/3&.)*/'4*j2@/'*Y"1&!&.'*f).1"!!"! LXIII, 131-144.
Bolle, Friedel and Alexander Kritikos, 1998. “Self-Centered Inequality Aversion versus
Reciprocity and Altruism”, mimeo, Europa-Universität Viadrina.
Bolton, Gary E., 1991. “A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence.”*S@")&1/'
b1.'.@&1*U"3&"5 81, 1096-1136.
Bolton, Gary and Rami Zwick, 1995. “Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining”,
Z/@"!*/'4*b1.'.@&1*`"+/3&.) 10, 95-121.
Bolton, Gary E., Jordi Brandts, and Axel Ockenfels, 1998. “Measuring Motivations for the
Reciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game”, b0-")&@"'(/#*b1.'.@&1!
3, 207-221.
Bolton, Gary E. and Ockenfels, Axel, 2000. A theory of equity, reciprocity and competition.
S@")&1/'*b1.'.@&1*U"3&"5 100, 166-193.
Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis, 1999. “The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity”, mimeo,
University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis, 2000. “Reciprocity, Self-Interest, and the Welfare State”,
D.)4&1*a.2)'/#*.$*f.#&(&1/#*b1.'.@, 26, 33-53.
Brandts, Jordi and Gary Charness, 1999. “Gift-Exchange with Excess Supply and Excess
Demand”, mimeo, Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona.
Camerer, Colin F., 1999. “Social Preferences in Dictator, Ultimatum and Trust Games.” h&@"..
California Institute of Technology.
Camerer, Colin F. and Thaler, Richard H., 1995. Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners. a.2)'/#*.$
b1.'.@&1*f")!-"1(&3"! 9, 209-19.
Cameron, Lisa A., 1999. “ Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence
from Indonesia.” b1.'.@&1%T'I2&), 37(1), 47-59.
51
Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2000. “Punishing Free-Riders: The Role of Monitoring-Group Size,
Second-Order Free-Riding and Coordination”, mimeo, Middlebury College.
Chamberlin, Edward H., 1948. “An Experimental Imperfect Market”, a.2)'/#* .$* f.#&(&1/#
b1.'.@, 56, 95-108.
Charness, Gary, 1996. "Attribution and Reciprocity in a Labor Market: An Experimental
Investigation," mimeo, University of California at Berkeley;
Charness, Gary, 2000. “Responsibility and Effort in an Experimental Labor Market”, a.2)'/#*.$
b1.'.@&1*`"+/3&.)*/'4*c)>/'&</(&.' 42, 375-384.
Charness, Gary, and Rabin, Matthew, 2000. “Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New
Model.” h&@"., University of California at Berkeley.
Che, Yeon-Koo and Hausch, Donald B., 1999. “Cooperative Investments and the Value of
Contracting.” S@")&1/'*b1.'.@&1*U"3&"5 89(1), 125-47.
Cooper, David J., and Carol Kraker Stockman, 1999. “Fairness, Learning, and Constructive
Preferences: An Experimental Investigation”, mimeo, Case Western Reserve University.
Costa-Gomes, Miguel, and Klaus G. Zauner, 1999. “Learning, Non-equilibrium Beliefs, and
Non-Pecuniary Payoff Uncertainty in an Experimental Game”, mimeo, Harvard Business
School.
Cox, James C., 2000. “Trust and Reciprocity: Implications of Game Triads and Social Contexts”,
mimeo, University of Arizona at Tucson.
Croson, Rachel T. A., " Theories of Altruism and Reciprocity: Evidence from Linear Public
Goods Games," Discussion Paper, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1999.
Daughety, Andrew, 1994. “Socially-Influenced Choice: Equity Considerations in Models of
Consumer Choice and in Games”, mimeo, University of Iowa.
Davis, Douglas, and Charles Holt, 1993. b0-")&@"'(/#* b1.'.@&1!6 Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Dawes, Robyn M., and Richard Thaler, 1988. "Cooperation," a.2)'/#*.$*b1.'.@&1*f")!-"1(&3"!
II, 187-197.
Dufwenberg, Martin and Kirchsteiger, Georg, 1998. “A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity.”
Discussion Paper. CentER, Tilburg University.
Edlin, Aaron S. and Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. “Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and
Optimal Investment.” S@")&1/'*b1.'.@&1*U"3&"5 86(3), 478-501.
Eichenberger, Rainer and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 1998. “Focus Effects in Dictator Game
Experiments“, mimeo, University of Pennsylvania.
52
Ellingsen, Tore and Magnus Johannesson, 2000. “Is There a Hold-up Problem?”, Stockholm
School of Economics, Working Paper No. 357.
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1998. ]+"*D"5*b'1,1#.-/"4&/*`)&(/''&1/, Volume 1, London, 15th
edition.
Fahr, Renè and Bernd Irlenbusch, 2000. “Fairness as a Constraint on Trust in Reciprocity: Earned
Property Rights in a Reciprocal Exchange Experiment”, Economics Letters 66, 275-282.
Falk, Armin, Fehr, Ernst, and Fischbacher, Urs, 2000a. “Informal Sanctions”, Institute for
Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 59.
Falk, Armin, Fehr, Ernst, and Fischbacher, Urs, 2000b. “Testing Theories of Fairness - Intentions
Matter”, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Working
Paper No. 63.
Falk, Armin, Fehr, Ernst, and Fischbacher, Urs, 2000c. “Appropriating the Commons”, Institute
for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 55.
Falk, Armin and Fischbacher, Urs, 1999. “A Theory of Reciprocity.” Institute for Empirical
Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 6.
Falk, Armin, Simon Gächter, and Judith Kovács, 1999. “Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic
Incentives in a Repeated Game with Incomplete Contracts”, a.2)'/#* .$* b1.'.@&1
f!,1+.#.>,;
Fehr, Ernst and Armin Falk, 1999. “Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract
Market”, a.2)'/#*.$*f.#&(&1/#*b1.'.@, 107, 106-134.
Fehr, Ernst and Urs Fischbacher, 2000. “Third Party Punishment”, mimeo, University of Zürich.
Fehr, Ernst, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl, 1993. „Does Fairness prevent Market Clearing?
An Experimental Investigation,“ i2/)(")#,*a.2)'/#*.$*b1.'.@&1!  CVIII, 437-460.
Fehr, Ernst, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl, 1998. „Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in
Competitive Experimental Markets“, b2).-"/'*b1.'.@&1*U"3&"5 42, 1-34.
Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Co-operation.”
i2/)(")#,*a.2)'/#*.$*b1.'.@&1! 114, 817-868.
Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods
Experiments“, S@")&1/'*b1.'.@&1*U"3&"5 90, 980-994.
Fehr, Ernst, Simon Gächter and Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. “Reciprocity as a Contract
Enforcement Device”, b1.'.@"()&1/ 65, 833-860.
Fehr, Ernst, Klein, Alexander and Schmidt, Klaus M., 2000. “Endogenous Incomplete
Contracts.” h&@"., University of Munich, 2000.
53
Fehr, Ernst, Kremhelmer, Susanne and Schmidt, Klaus M., 2000. “Fairness and the Optimal
Allocation of Property Rights.” h&@"., University of Munich, 2000.
Fehr, Ernst and Tougareva, Elena, 1995: “Do High Monetary Stakes Remove Reciprocal
Fairness? Experimental Evidence from Russia.” h&@".. Institute for Empirical Economic
Research, University of Zurich.
Fischbacher, Urs, Simon Gächter and Ernst Fehr, 1999. “Are People Conditionally Cooperative?
Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment”, Working Paper No. 16, Institute for
Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich,.
Forsythe, Robert L., Joel Horowitz, N. E. Savin, and Martin Sefton, 1994. "Fairness in Simple
Bargaining Games," Z/@"!*/'4*b1.'.@&1*`"+/3&.) 6, 347-369.
Frey, Bruno and Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, 1984. “The Hidden Economy as an ‘Unobserved’
Variable”, b2).-"/'*b1.'.@&1*U"3&"5 26, 33-53.
Gächter, Simon and Armin Falk (1999): “Reputation or Reciprocity?“, Working Paper No. 19,
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich.
Geanakoplos, John, Pearce, David, and Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. “Psychological Games and
Sequential Rationality.” Z/@"!*/'4*b1.'.@&1*`"+/3&.) 1, 60-79.
Gintis, Herbert, 2000. “Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality”, Journal of Theoretical Biology
206, 169-179.
Greenberg, Jerald, 1990. “Employee Theft as a Reaction to Underpayment Inequity: The Hidden
cost of Pay Cuts”, a.2)'/#*.$*S--#&"4*f!,1+.#.>, 75, 56 –568.
Grossman, Sanford and Hart, Oliver, 1983. “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,
b1.'.@"()&1/ 51, 7-45.
Güth, Werner, Hartmut Kliemt and Axel Ockenfels, 2000. “Fairness versus Efficiency – An
Experimental Study of Mutual Gift-Giving”, mimeo, Humboldt University of Berlin.
Güth, Werner, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze, 1982. "An Experimental Analysis of
Ultimatium Bargaining," a.2)'/#*.$*b1.'.@&1*`"+/3&.)*/'4*c)>/'&</(&.' III, 367-88.
Güth, Werner and Eric van Damme, 1998. “Information, Strategic Behavior and Fairness in
Ultimatum Bargaining: an Experimental Study”, a.2)'/#*.$*h/(+"@/(&1/#*f!,1+.#.>, 42,
227-247.
Hannan, Lynn, John Kagel, and Donald Moser, 1999. “Partial Gift Exchange in Experimental
Labor Markets: Impact of Subject Population Differences, Productivity Differences and
Effort Requests on Behavior”, @&@".6*University of Pittsburgh.
54
Harsanyi, John, 1955. “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons
of Utility”, a.2)'/#*.$*f.#&(&1/#*b1.'.@, 63, 309-321.
Hart, Oliver and Moore, John, 1990. “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm”, a.2)'/#*.$
f.#&(&1/#*b1.'.@, 98, 1119-58.
Hart, Oliver and Moore, John, 1999. “Foundations of Incomplete Contracts.” U"3&"5* .$
b1.'.@&1*d(24&"! 66, 115-138.
Hoffman, Elisabeth, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat, and Vernon Smith, 1994. „Preferences,
Property Right, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games”, Z/@"!*/'4*b1.'.@&1*`"+/3&.) 7,
346-380.
Hoffman, Elisabeth, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon Smith, 1996. "On Expectations and Monetary
Stakes in Ultimatum Games,"  T'(")'/(&.'/#*a.2)'/#*.$*Z/@"*]+".), 25, 289-301.
Holmström, Bengt and Milgrom, Paul, 1991. “Multi-task Principal-Agent Analyses.” a.2)'/#*.$
g/56*b1.'.@&1!6*/'4*c)>/'&</(&.' 7 (Sp.), 24-52.
Isaac, Mark R., James M. Walker, Arlington W. Williams, 1994. “ Group Size and the voluntary
Provision of Public Goods”, a.2)'/#*.$*f2V#&1*b1.'.@&1! 54, 1-36.
Kagel, John H, Chung Kim and Donald Moser, 1996. “Fairness in Ultimatum Games with
Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs”, Z/@"!*/'4*b1.'.@&1*`"+/3&.) 13,
100-110.
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on
Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," S@")&1/'*b1.'.@&1*U"3&"5 LXXVI, 728-41.
Kirchsteiger, Georg, 1994. “The Role of Envy in Ultimatum Games”, a.2)'/#* .$* b1.'.@&1
`"+/3&.)*/'4*c)>/'&</(&.' 25, 373-389.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and  Tirole, Jean, 1993. S* ]+".),* .$* U">2#/(&.'* /'4* f).12)"@"'(.
Cambridge (Mass.): MIT-Press.
Ledyard, John, 1995. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research", Chap. 2 in: Alvin
Roth and John Kagel (eds.), j/'4V..X*.$*b0-")&@"'(/#*b1.'.@&1!. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Levine, David, 1998. “Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments”, Review of
Economic Dynamics 1, 593-622.
Lind, Allan and Tom Tyler, 1988. ]+"*d.1&/#*f!,1+.#.>,*.$*f).1"42)/#*a2!(&1". New York and
London: Plenum Press.
List, John and Todd Cherry, 2000. “Examining the Role of Fairness in Bargaining Games”,
mimeo, University of Arizona at Tucson.
55
McCabe, Kevin, Mary Rigdon and Vernon Smith, 2000. “Positive Reciprocity and Intentions in
Trust Games”, mimeo, University of Arizona at Tucson.
Miller, Sven (1997): “Strategienuntersuchung zum Investitionsspiel von Berg, Dickhaut,
McCabe”, Y&-#.@/*(+"!&!, University of Bonn.
Neilson, William, 2000. “An Axiomatic Characterization of the Fehr-Schmidt Model of Inequity
Aversion”, mimeo, Department of Economics, Texas A&M University.
Nöldeke, G., Schmidt, K.M., 1995. Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-
Up Problem. U/'4*a.2)'/#*.$*b1.'.@&1! 26, 163-179.
Offerman, Theo, 1999. “Hurting hurts more than helping helps: The Role of the self-serving
Bias”, mimeo, University of Amsterdam.
Ostrom, Elinor, 1990. “Z.3")'&'>* (+"*^.@@.'!* 8*]+"* b3.#2(&.'* .$* T'!(&(2(&.'!* $.)*^.##"1(&3"
S1(&.'”, New York: Cambridge University Press
Ostrom, Elinor, 2000. “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms”, a.2)'/#* .$
b1.'.@&1*f")!-"1(&3"! 14, 137-158.
Rabin, Matthew, 1993. “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics.” S@")&1/'
b1.'.@&1*U"3&"5, 83(5), 1281-1302.
Roth, Alvin E., Michael W. K. Malouf, and J. Keith Murningham, 1981. „Sociological versus
strategic Factors in Bargaining“, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2, 153-
177.
Roth, Alvin E., Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, and Shmuel Zamir, 1991.
"Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An
Experimental Study,"  S@")&1/'*b1.'.@&1*U"3&"5 81, 1068-95.
Roth, Alvin E., 1995. "Bargaining Experiments," in: J. Kagel and A. Roth (eds.): j/'4V..X*.$
b0-")&@"'(/#*b1.'.@&1!6  Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Roth, Alvin E., and Ido Erev, 1995. "Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and
Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term," Z/@"!* /'4*b1.'.@&1*`"+/3&.) 8,
164-212.
Samuelson, Paul A., 1993. “Altruism as a Problem Involving Group versus Individual Selection
in Economics and Biology.” S@")&1/'*b1.'.@&1*U"3&"5 83, 143-148.
Segal, Uzi and Sobel, Joel, 1999. “Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in
Strategic Settings.” h&@"., University of California at San Diego.
Segal, Ilya, 1999. “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts.”
U"3&"5*.$*b1.'.@&1*d(24&"! 66(1), 57-82.
56
Seidl, Christian and Stefan Traub, 1999. “Taxpayers’ Attitudes, Behavior, and Perceptions of
Fairness in Taxation”, mimeo, Institut für Finanzwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik,
University of Kiel.
Sen, Amartya, 1995. “Moral Codes and Economic Success”, C. S. Britten and A. Hamlin (eds.),
Market Capitalism and Moral Values, Edward Eldar, Aldershot.
Selten, Reinhard and Axel Ockenfels, 1998. “An Experimental Solidarity Game”, Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 34, 517-539.
Sethi, Rajiv and E. Somananthan, forthcoming. Preference Evolution and Reciprocity, a.2)'/#*.$
b1.'.@&1*]+".),.
Sethi, Rajiv and E. Somananthan, 2000. Understanding Reciprocity, mimeo, Columbia
University.
Slonim, Robert, and Alvin E. Roth, 1997.  "Financial Incentives and Learning in Ultimatum and
Market Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," b1.'.@"()&1/ 65, 569-596.
Smith, Adam, 1759, reprinted 1982. ]+"*]+".),*.$*h.)/#*d"'(&@"'(!. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Smith, Vernon L., 1962. "An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior," a.2)'/#*.$
f.#&(&1/#*b1.'.@, 70, 111-137.
Sonnemans, Joep, Arthur Schram and Theo Offerman, 1999. „Strategic Behavior in Public Good
Games – When Partners drift apart“, b1.'.@&1!*g"((")! 62, 35-41.
Suleiman, Ramzi, 1996. “Expectations and Fairness in a modified Ultimatum Game”, a.2)'/#*.$
b1.'.@&1*f!,1+.#.>, 17, 531-554.
Veblen, Thorsten, 1922. ]+"*]+".),*.$* (+"*g"&!2)"*^#/!!*8*S'*b1.'.@&1*d(24,*.$* T'!(&(2(&.'!,
George Allen Unwin, London (first published 1899).
Zajac, Edward, 1995. “f.#&(&1/#*b1.'.@,*.$*k/&)'"!!”, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Zizzo, Daniel and Andrew Oswald, 2000. “Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others’
Income”, mimeo, Oxford University.
